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Gouverner c’est pr´ evoir (Emile de Girardin, 1806-1881)
Implicit in any monetary policy action or inaction is an expectation of how the future will
unfold, that is, a forecast. (Greenspan, 1994, p. 241)
Forecasts play an important role in economic policy making, because the economic consequences
of a policy decision made today only unfold over time and the new policy is typically intended to
remain in place for some period. They are unavoidably fraught with uncertainty due to imperfect
understanding and observation of the mechanisms and forces determining economic outcomes. For-
mal treatments of the proper use of forecasts in policy making go back to Theil (1958) building on
Tinbergen (1952)’s theory of economic policy. Theil suggested that (i) the policy authorities have to
predict impending changes in the economic environment; (ii) then they have to prepare forecasts of
the effect of adjustments in the policy instrument, and (iii) based on these forecasts a plan of policy
actions must be developed. The following practical example is still relevant today: ”In the case of
employment policy, it is necessary to obtain some idea as to the factors controlling next year’s or next
quarter’s employment level. If this leads to a predicted employment which is considered too low, the
policy-maker will try to ﬁnd measures in order to increase the level; and then it is necessary to predict
the effectiveness of alternative measures, i.e., of the reaction of variables which are not controlled to
changes in controlled variables. This leads to a plan of actions, which may be followed or abandoned
in the light of subsequent events.” (Theil, 1958, p. 3).
Of course, forecasts can be usefully employed in many areas of economic policy. In this hand-
book chapter we focus on the forecasting models and methods used in the context of monetary and
ﬁscal policies for assessing their consequences for aggregate economic ﬂuctuations. Central banks
have long been concerned with estimating the transmission of changes in policy instruments such
as the short-term nominal interest rate to target variables such as the rates of inﬂation and output
growth. Their decisions are typically related to forecasts and adjusted frequently in response to new
data, which induce forecast revisions. Fiscal policy has many tasks. Policy makers regularly need to
decide on the size of the government budget, how to ﬁnance and how to spend it. They have multiple
instruments at their disposal. Furthermore, budgetary forecasts are inﬂuenced in turn by economic de-
velopments. Occasionally, ﬁscal authorities also consider major reforms in taxation, debt or spending
policies that require forward-looking impact assessments.
The role of forecasts in policy making is a very broad topic. Space requirements force us to omit
many relevant and interesting theories, techniques and applications. Wherever possible we refer to
other sources for topics that are only treated in a cursory fashion in this chapter. Instead, we focus
on a few speciﬁc and related questions. Section 2 begins with a recent practical example concerning
the role of forecasts in policy making, namely prediction of the GDP impact of 2009 ﬁscal stimulus
legislation in the United States. Then it presents a simple theoretical framework for linking forecasts
with policy preferences and policy decisions. This framework applies the principles of Tinbergen and
3Theil’s theory of forecasting and policy making to central bank interest rate decisions for macroeco-
nomic stabilization purposes. Alternatively, a modiﬁed version of this framework with a ﬁscal sector
could be used to analyze the role of ﬁscal policy in macroeconomic stabilization.
Section 3 reviews examples of forecasts produced at ﬁscal and monetary authorities. Particular
emphasisisgiventoforecastsproducedattheFederalReserveandtheEuropeanCentralBankbecause
theyareused againinsubsequent sections. Insection4 weaddress thequestionwhether policymakers
adjust their decisions directly in response to economic forecasts. Answering this question requires an
empirical investigation. Of course, it is easiest to search for such a link in an environment in which
decision makers are exposed to a particular forecast on a regular basis and shortly thereafter make a
policy decision that becomes public right away. Thus, it is most easily tested in the context of central
bank interest rate policy. We show that interest rate setting by the Federal Reserve and the European
Central Bank is quite well explained by a response to forecasts.
Section 5 then reviews how to compute forecasts that account for the interaction with policy
decisions. Thus, it focuses on the use of structural macroeconomic models for forecasting. These
models incorporate explicit assumptions regarding the decision making of monetary and ﬁscal policy
makers concerning variables such as government spending, taxes, transfers, central bank interest rates
and central bank money. Furthermore, they provide characterizations of the decision making and
expectations formation of households and ﬁrms that indicate how they will change their behavior in
response to systematic changes in policy maker decisions. We review models used at central banks,
ﬁscal authorities and international institutions. Then we construct forecasts from a small projection
model used at the International Monetary Fund and from a medium-size DSGE model that is similar
to models now widely available to staff at monetary and ﬁscal authorities. Of speciﬁc interest to us are
methods used for conditioning forecasts on particular planned policy initiatives. An application deals
with projecting the GDP impact of US ﬁscal stimulus legislation discussed in the practical example
of section 2. The section concludes with an assessment of forecast accuracy and a comparison of
model and expert forecasts. Given the observed heterogeneity of forecasts, the chapter closes with
a normative analysis of the performance and robustness of forecast-based policy rules under model
uncertainty in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The role of forecasts in policy making: A practical example and a
theoretical framework
2.1 A practical example: Forecasts in U.S. ﬁscal policy
To illustrate the interaction of forecasts and policy decisions, we consider the following example from
the United States. On February 17, 2009, U.S. Congress enacted the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act (ARRA). It was a very unusual policy measure involving spending increases, transfers
and tax reductions on the scale of 787 billion U.S. dollars that were meant to stimulate economic ac-
tivity following the global ﬁnancial crisis. On January 7, 2009, the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce had
4published its regular Budget and Economic Outlook for the next 10 years. Its forecast for the remain-
der of 2009 implied a drop in real GDP of 2.2 percent followed by an increase of 1.5 percent in 2010.
As usual, the CBO’s near-term outlook was based on the assumption that ”current laws and policies
governing federal spending and taxes do not change” and therefore did ”not include the effects of a
possible ﬁscal stimulus package”.1 On January 9, President Obama’s advisers Christina Romer and
Jared Bernstein circulated a report on the impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan
predicting that such a plan could raise GDP by 3.6 percent above the baseline forecast within 2 years
(Romer and Bernstein, 2009). Their calculations were based on measures of government spending and
tax multipliers obtained from private sector forecasters and the Federal Reserve. Over the course of
January and early February 2009, CBO prepared several budgetary and economic impact forecasts of
the stimulus legislation debated and eventually passed in the House of Representatives and the Senate
in response to requests by members of U.S. Congress. On March 20, 2009 CBO released an update of
its budget and economic outlook taking into account the policy changes implied by the ARRA as well
as new incoming economic data suggesting a more negative economic outlook than the data available
for the January forecast.2 On this basis, they predicted a steeper decline of real GDP in 2009 of -3.0
percent followed by an increase of 2.9 percent in 2010.
This example shows that economic policy is not only based on macroeconomic forecasts, but that
the path of policy itself has a direct effect on projections of macroeconomic aggregates. Thus, fore-
casters need to base their predictions on speciﬁc assumptions regarding future policy. For example,
professional forecasters and macroeconomists often use a particular future path for ﬁscal policy that
they consider most likely to occur or an estimated feedback rule that accounts for the response of
future policy to projected future economic conditions. Forecasters employed by policy institutions
typically also consider forecasts that are conditioned on unchanged policy as in the case of the CBO
outlook. While such forecasts do not represent their best possible prediction of the future course of
events, they are often used as a benchmark for the policy debate that helps set up desirable policy
changes. Another important issue concerns the choice of economic model on which the forecast is to
be conditioned. With regard to the ARRA, for example, a study by Cogan et al. (2010) using state-
of-the-art New Keynesian models estimated much smaller multipliers than the models in Romer and
Bernstein and predicted only about 1/6 of the GDP impact.3
2.2 A simple framework for modeling the interaction of forecasts and policy decisions
In his formal treatment of economic policy, Tinbergen (1952) describes economic policy as the max-
imization of a collective ophelimity function by the government. This function contains a number of
variables that the policy maker wants to inﬂuence but that are not directly under her control. These
variables are called targets. Policy is implemented by manipulating variables that may be directly
1See Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2009 to 2019, January 2009.
2See Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, A Preliminary Analysis of the President’s Budget and an Update of CBO’s Budget
and Economic Outlook, March 20, 2009.
3A ﬁrst working paper version was circulated shortly after the bill was passed in February.
5controlled by the policy maker—so-called control or instrument variables. Tinbergen (1952) differ-
entiates between quantitative and qualitative policy changes. Qualitative changes imply a change in
the economic structure. Examples are the dissolution of a monopoly, the introduction of a customs
union or a monetary union. Thus, qualitative policy involves choosing from a ﬁnite number of policy
alternatives. Quantitative policy changes are deﬁned as adjusting certain policy parameters or instru-
ments such as taxes, government expenditures or interest rates to achieve policy goals within a given
economic structure. Conveniently, Tinbergen (1952) lists the following steps for the proper conduct
of economic policy:
(i) choose a collective preference indicator;
(ii) deduce targets for economic policy from this indicator;
(iii) choose adequate instruments for achieving the targets;
(iv) determine quantitative values of the instrument variables;
(v) and formulate the connection between the targets and the instruments and the structure of the
economy.
With regard to forecasts, Theil (1958, p.3) stresses that
”A realistic analysis of the relationship between forecasts and policy must be based on
the assumption of several variables controlled and not controlled by the policy-maker, of
their interrelationships, (and) of the policy-maker’s preferences which serve to formalize
the optimality criterion”.
In the following, we review central bank interest rate policy using Tinbergen’s nomenclature and
present a simple framework for linking forecasts with policy preferences and policy decisions aimed
at controlling inﬂation and stabilizing economic ﬂuctuations. Alternatively, a modiﬁed version of this
framework with a ﬁscal sector could be used to analyze the role of ﬁscal policy in macroeconomic
stabilization.
A simple model linking forecasts and interest rate decisions: Policy objective and instrument
Typically, central banks do not publish an explicit objective function regarding collective eco-
nomic welfare nor do they claim to optimize such a function.4 Rather, a small number of targets or
even a single principal target is speciﬁed by law. For example, the U.S Federal Reserve Act asks
the U.S. central bank ”to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and
moderate long-term interest rates”. The Fed itself clariﬁes that stable prices in the long-run are a
pre-condition for the other two goals, while acknowledging a short-run tradeoff between inﬂation and
employment stabilization.5 As to the euro area, the Maastricht treaty expresses a hierarchy of targets.
4An exception is the procedure of the central bank of Norway. Objective functions that represent the bank’s mandate and
the board’s policy preferences and the model used to produce forecasts and guide monetary policy are public and discussed
in some in detail for example in Alstadheim et al. (2010).
5See ”The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions”, www.federalreserve.gov.
6”The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability” and ” without prejudice to the
objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the community”,
which is explained further as a high level of employment and sustainable and non-inﬂationary growth.
Many other central banks are tasked with a primary responsibility for price stability and publish a
numerical target for the rate of inﬂation. According to Bernanke et al. (1999) ” inﬂation targeting is
a framework for monetary policy characterized by the public announcement of ofﬁcial quantitative
targets (or target ranges) over one or more time horizons, and by explicit acknowledgment that low,
stable inﬂation is monetary policy’s primary long-run goal.”6
Research and technical policy analysis require a mathematical speciﬁcation of central bank ob-
jectives in order to evaluate a particular policy. There is a long tradition of using loss functions that
penalize squared deviations of the target variables from a desired value. For example, price stability
could be measured with regard to squared deviations of the price level from a target value or target
path. Inﬂation targeting, instead, may be evaluated in terms of inﬂation deviations from target. Other
variables, such as output or employment deviations from natural rates or the variability of the change
of interest rates are also often included in such loss functions. The following example captures the
dual objective of the Federal Reserve, though with output in place of employment:
L = E
⎡
⎣
∞  
j=0
βj[(πt+j − π∗)2 + λ(yt+j − y∗
t+j)2]|It
⎤
⎦. (1)
E denotes the expectations operator conditional on the policy maker’s information set It in period
t. πt is the inﬂation rate and π∗ is the inﬂation target.7 yt denotes output, while y∗
t refers to the
associated target. Central banks typically associate y∗
t with potential output, ¯ yt, which is the long-run
level of output consistent with stable inﬂation. It is important to recognize that potential output is an
unobservable variable and central banks would have to rely on imprecise estimates in pursuing such
an objective (cf. Orphanides and van Norden, 2002). There are two preference parameters. β is a
discount factor, (0 <β<1), while λ>0 indicates the weight assigned to output relative to inﬂation
stabilization. Interestingly, this particular loss function also happens to approximate representative-
household utility in a speciﬁc small-scale New-Keynesian model (see Woodford, 2003).8 Arguably,
it does not reﬂect very well the hierarchical nature of objectives—i.e. price stability ﬁrst—that is
enshrined in many central bank laws.
6The ECB differentiates itself from inﬂation-targeting central banks by means of its two-pillar strategy which involves
a medium-term cross-check with monetary trends. Its numerical deﬁnition of price stability is an inﬂation rate below, but
close to 2 percent.
7As to the Federal Reserve, Chairman Bernanke explained in 2009 that ”the longer-term projections of inﬂation may be
interpreted [...] as the rate of inﬂation that FOMC participants see as most consistent with the dual mandate given to it by
Congress – that is the rate of inﬂation that promotes maximum sustainable employment while also delivering reasonable
price stability,” (Bernanke, 2009) As of January 2012 the FOMC speciﬁed its target publicly.
8A positive value of the inﬂation target is often justiﬁed as a means for minimizing the impact of the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates on policy effectiveness (Coenen and Wieland, 2004).
7Turning to the main instrument of monetary policy, nowadays most central banks use a short-
term interest rate such as the federal funds rate in the United States.9 Following Taylor (1993) it has
become quite common to characterize central bank policy as an interest rate rule that responds to
recent outcomes (or nowcasts) of target variables such as inﬂation and the output gap:
it =¯ r + π∗ + φπ(πt − π∗)+φy(yt − y∗
t). (2)
Here, ¯ r refers to an equilibrium real interest rate, which together with the inﬂation target, sums to the
equilibrium nominal rate. φπ and φy constitute the central bank’s response parameters. Using values
of 2 percent for ¯ r and π∗, 1.5 for φπ and 0.5 for φy, Taylor (1993) showed that the implied interest rate
path matches Federal Reserve policy from 1987 to 1992 very well. However, he had not estimated this
relationship. Rather, these values of the response coefﬁcients had delivered good stabilization perfor-
mance in a variety of models used in a major model- and policy-comparison exercise (see Bryant et al.
(1993)). Such performance evaluations follow Tinbergen’s task list by using models of the relation-
ship between policy instruments and targets (item (v)) to investigate the performance of interest rate
rules (items (iii) and (iv)) with regard to a loss function that is speciﬁed in terms of target variables
such as equation (1), (items (i) and (ii)). Speciﬁcally, these evaluations used the weighted average
of the unconditional variance of inﬂation and the output gap, that is the limiting case of equation (1)
without discounting.10
Of course, just as central banks have typically avoided committing to a particular loss function,
they have also abstained from announcing a ﬁxed interest rate rule. Nevertheless, inﬂation targeting
central banks such as the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England have used Taylor-style rules with
forecastsearlyoninordertooperationalizeinﬂation-forecasttargetinginmodel-basedevaluationsand
projections (cf. Haldane, 1995; Amano et al., 1998; Batini and Haldane, 1999). Such a forecast-based
interest-rate rule can be deﬁned analogously to equation (2):
it =¯ r + π∗ + φπ,h(E[πt+h|It] − π∗)+φy,k(E[yt+k − y∗
t+k|It]), (3)
where the subscripts h and k denote the forecast horizons of inﬂation and output forecasts, respec-
tively. The policy maker’s target is included in the expectation, assuming that policymakers aim at
potential output. Similarly, its current value in equation (2) has to be understood as a nowcast.
The macroeconomic model
Item (v) on Tinbergen’s list requires a particular model of the transmission of monetary policy to
policy targets. As a simple example, we consider the following three-equation model in the spirit of
9We abstract from other instruments used when interest policy is inhibited by the zero-lower-bound as in the course of
the recent recession. See Wieland (2010) for a review of earlier research on policy instruments at the zero-bound.
10See Taylor (1999) and Taylor and Wieland (2011) for similar studies.
8Svensson (1997) and Orphanides and Wieland (2000b):
πt+1 = πt + κ(yt − ¯ yt)+γzt+1 +  t+1 (4)
yt+1 − ¯ yt+1 = α(yt − ¯ yt) − σ(it − πt − ¯ r)+δzt+1 + ηt+1 (5)
zt+1 = θ1πt + θ2(yt − ¯ yt)+θ3zt + νt+1, (6)
The model consists of a Phillips curve, which relates inﬂation to the output gap and an IS curve which
indicates the dependence of the output gap on the interest rate, that is the policy instrument. zt serves
as a stand-in for other, possibly endogenous, variables affecting output and inﬂation, and is deter-
mined according to the third equation in the model. ( t+1,η t+1,ν t+1) refer to normally-distributed
economic shocks with mean zero and known variance. (α,κ,γ,σ,δ,θ1,θ 2,θ 3) denote model parame-
ters. Monetary policy suffers from a transmission lag. It takes two periods for a change of the interest
rate to affect inﬂation.
This model may be estimated and then used as a testing ground for optimizing simple outcome-
or forecast-based feedback rules as in the above-mentioned model comparison studies. Speciﬁcally,
the policy response coefﬁcients (φπ,φ y) and (φπ,h,φ y,k) in equations (2) and (3), would be chosen
to minimize the loss deﬁned by (1) (or its limiting version without discounting) subject to the model
deﬁned by equations (4), (5) and (6). For example, the comparison study in Taylor (1999) included
a similar model by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). The role of forecasts in such policy evaluations
is consistent with Theil’s proposition. Firstly, the forecast-based rule involves a policy response to
the rational expectation/forecast of inﬂation and the output gap conditional on the macroeconomic
model including the policy rule. Secondly, the optimization exercise with the outcome-based rule can
be interpreted as a rational forecast of output and inﬂation variability conditional on the model and
this particular rule. Of course, in the applications discussed later in this chapter, we will also consider
state-of-the-art macro models that include forward-looking expectations by households and ﬁrms
in the economic structure. In this case, policy optimization and associated forecasts will also need
to differentiate the case of discretionary policy when private sector expectations do not incorporate
policy commitments from the case when institutions are in place that allow for credible commitment.
Optimal control policy and forecast targeting
An alternative to simple policy rules is given by the optimal control policy. Optimal control would
imply choosing a path of the policy instrument it that minimizes expected losses, deﬁned by equation
(1), subject to the model of the economy represented by equations (4), (5) and (6) and the information
set It. Optimal control does not impose the particular functional form for policy implied by simple
rules such as (2) and (3). However, given that the model considered is linear in the relevant state
variables ,(πt,y t − ¯ yt,z t), and the objective is quadratic in the target variables, (π,y), the optimal
control policy turns out to be a linear function of the states:
it =¯ r + π∗ + ˜ φπ(πt − π∗)+˜ φy(yt − y∗
t)+˜ φzzt, (7)
9where it is assumed that the policy maker observes potential output ¯ yt and sets the target y∗
t accord-
ingly. Contrary to the simple rules discussed above, the optimal control policy implies a direct interest
rate response to all state variables, including zt, which stands for many variables that affect output and
inﬂation. The forecast-based rule incorporates an indirect response to all state variables via the inﬂa-
tion and output forecasts, but the functional form of this rule imposes additional restrictions on the
coefﬁcients relative to the optimal control policy. The optimal control coefﬁcients ˜ φπ, ˜ φy and ˜ φz are
nonlinear functions of the structural model and loss function parameters (κ,γ,α,σ,δ,θ1,θ 2,θ 3,β,λ).
These coefﬁcients are generally different from the response parameters in the simple rules, that is
(φπ,φ y) and (φπ,h,φ y,k). Forecasts of future inﬂation and output deviations from the central bank’s
targets—conditional on the central bank’s model and information set—are used in optimizing the path
of the central bank interest rate.
No central bank has publicly announced that it strictly implements an optimal control policy and
communicated all the preference and model parameters needed for the policy calculation. Svens-
son (1999, 2003) has proposed to mimic the optimal control policy by pursuing a so-called forecast
targeting rule. This rule is expressed in forecasts of the target variables output and inﬂation, rather
than directly implementable interest rate prescriptions. In his terminology the loss function with in-
ﬂation and the output gap in equation (1) is referred to as ﬂexible inﬂation targeting. He breaks the
optimization problem in two steps. First, he derives the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to output
and inﬂation conditional on the Phillips curve, equation (4), that determines the economic tradeoff
between these two target variables. In the second step, the other model equations are used to derive
the interest rate setting. This interest rate setting is equivalent to the optimal control policy deﬁned by
equation (7). Svensson (2003) shows that the optimality condition corresponds to,
E[πt+j+1 − π∗|It]=
λ
βκ
(βE[(yt+j+1 − y∗
t+j+1) − (yt+j − y∗
t+j)|It]),j ≥ 0. (8)
forthe casewhenzt isexogenous. This relationshipbetween output andinﬂation forecastsprovidesan
implicit deﬁnition of the optimal control policy. With regard to its practical implementation, Svensson
(2003) recommends that ”the central bank staff construct the ”feasible” set of forecasts and instru-
ment plans. The decision-making body ... then selects the combination of forecasts that ”look best”
...., the best compromise between stabilizing the inﬂation gap and the output gap. ” This recommenda-
tion is similar but not identical to another often-used description of inﬂation forecast targeting, which
states that central banks should set policy such that the implied inﬂation forecast is equal to the central
bank’s target at some given, constant horizon.
In the last twenty years a number of countries have adopted explicit inﬂation targeting regimes.
They use forecasts extensively in their communication with markets. A possible description of their
policy strategy is one in which the stance of policy is adjusted to ensure that the inﬂation rate is
projected to return to target within an acceptable period (see e.g. Leiderman and Svensson, 1995;
Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999). The optimal control approach to inﬂation
targeting - often referred to as forecast targeting - is developed in detail in Svensson (2010) , Svensson
(2011), Woodford (2007) and Woodford (2011).
10An equivalence result
Having presented several different approaches to the use of forecasts in policy design, namely sim-
ple outcome-based rules, simple forecast-based rules, optimal control policies and forecast targeting
rules, we close by noting an equivalence result that is obtained under restrictive conditions. Speciﬁ-
cally, if the parameters γ and δ are set to zero, the other endogenous variable(s) denoted by zt do not
affect inﬂation or output. Thus, the optimal control policy takes the form of a simple outcome-based
rule and can also be expressed as a forecast-based rule with the one-period-ahead inﬂation forecast:
it =¯ r + π∗ + ˜ φπ(πt − π∗)+˜ φy(yt − y∗
t), or (9)
it =¯ r + π∗ + ˜ φπ,1(E[πt+1|It] − π∗)+˜ φy,0(yt − y∗
t). (10)
In other words, there is one particular setting of the response parameters in the outcome-based rule,
(˜ φπ , ˜ φy ), a different one in the forecast-based rule, (˜ φπ,1, ˜ φy,0), which render these rules identical to
the optimal control policy. This setting could also be obtained by minimizing the loss function subject
to the model and the particular form of the policy rule.
In sum, if the economic model exactly matches the true macroeconomic relations in the economy,
then a central bank that implements the optimal control policy will achieve better or equal stabilization
outcomes than simple outcome- or forecast-based rules. However, the optimal control solution is
more complicated than either of the simple rules, making it more difﬁcult to communicate to the
public. Forecast targeting may help in organizing the implementation of an optimal control policy,
but it does not provide an explicit prescription for the instrument setting that can be checked by
the public as easily as simple rules. Forecast-based simple rules provide an avenue for taking into
account additional information on the state and structure of the economy relative to outcome-based
rules. Yet, given that the true structure is unknown, there is a risk that some of this information is
misleading. Thus, it is of great interest to compare the robustness of different policy and forecasting
approaches under model uncertainty as in (Levin et al., 2003). The interaction of forecast-based pol-
icy and economic ﬂuctuations can be studied in structural macroeconomic models, which can also be
used to search for efﬁcient and robust policy prescriptions. We will return to this question in section 6.
Preference and forecast asymmetries
The model we have considered features a quadratic loss function. This loss is symmetric, i.e. de-
viations of inﬂation or output above or below the respective target values are equally undesirable from
the policy makers’ perspective. In practice, central banks may treat such deviations asymmetrically.
For example, they might react more aggressively to recessions by lowering interest rates to a greater
extent than they would raise interest rates in the event of a boom of the same absolute magnitude.
Such decision making would be consistent with an asymmetric loss function that penalizes negative
deviations of output from potential more than positive deviations. The policy induced by such pref-
erences would then induce an upward bias in inﬂation (see Nobay and Peel (2003) and Surico (2007)
for analytical expositions and Surico for an empirical analysis of Federal Reserve policy).
11An important consequence of asymmetric loss functions would be an asymmetry in forecasts.
For example, Patton and Timmermann (2007) analyse Federal Reserve output growth forecasts and
ﬁnd that they are suboptimal under a symmetric loss function. However, the forecasts are optimal if
overpredicting output growth is more costly than underpredicting it.
Asymmetric loss may also be an important feature of ﬁscal policy making and exert an inﬂuence
on government budget forecasts. Empirical evidence is provided by Elliott et al. (2005). They analyze
International Monetary Fund and OECD forecasts of budget deﬁcits in the G7 countries. They argue
that underestimating budget deﬁcits yields different costs than overestimating budget deﬁcits (see also
Artis and Marcellino, 2001; Campbell and Ghysels, 1995). The shape of a forecast loss function might
be inﬂuenced by political pressure of member countries or the budgetary discipline that these forecasts
might impose. Elliott et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the IMF and OECD forecasts systematically overpredict
budget deﬁcits, a ﬁnding which would be in line with the budgetary discipline argument. For some
countries they ﬁnd that underpredictions of budget deﬁcits are viewed up to three times costlier than
overpredictions. If policy makers in the member countries want to use these forecasts, but do not have
the same loss function as the forecaster they would need to adjust the forecasts.
3 Examples of forecasts produced at ﬁscal authorities and central
banks
Table 1 lists a number of forecasts that are of particular relevance for monetary and ﬁscal policy
making and regularly published by policy institutions such as the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, the European Central Bank, the European
Commission and other central banks and international organizations.
3.1 Forecasts for ﬁscal policy purposes
As discussed in the introduction to this paper the Budget and Economic Outlook of the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce is an essential part of the federal budgeting process in the United States. The forecasts
are published every year in January and submitted to the House and Senate Committees on the Budget.
The report is updated mid-year. In addition, the CBO publishes an analysis of the President’s Bud-
getary Proposals for the upcoming ﬁscal year. The CBO forecasts play an important role in ensuring
that the budgetary developments remain in accordance with any targeted deﬁcit or surplus. Assump-
tions regarding future policy underlying the CBO’s baseline forecast are based on rules established
in The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deﬁcit Control Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-177).11 The
baseline estimate assumes that existing policies and laws continue in the future. Speciﬁcally, direct
spending and receipts are assumed to continue at the level prescribed by current law. Discretionary
11The rules expired on September 30, 2006, but the CBO continues to follow the methodology prescribed in the law for
establishing baseline projections.
12spending is assumed to continue at the level of current year spending adjusted for inﬂation and other
factors. CBOs baseline projections are not intended to be a forecast of future budgetary outcomes, but
are supposed to serve as a neutral benchmark. In addition, CBO publishes alternative scenarios that
include changes in future policies.
In the European Union and the euro area ﬁscal policy is conducted by national governments.
However, the European Commission provides forecasts in a publication called European Economic
Forecast. Forecasts are published twice a year with some interim updates for the largest member
states. Forecasts are computed for the individual countries, the euro area, the EU, candidate countries
and some non-EU countries. The forecast covers 180 variables. Individual country forecasts are
computed by country desks using different economic models and econometric tools. The forecasts
for the euro area and the EU are constructed by aggregating the country forecasts. The government
of the United Kingdom recently founded a new Ofﬁce for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in May 2010
that is tasked to assess public ﬁnances for each government budget similar to the CBO in the United
States. It produces economic and ﬁscal forecasts and evaluates the long-run sustainability of public
ﬁnances. Similar to the CBO the OBR publishes reports analyzing the accuracy of its own forecasting
record.
Table 1: Examples of important forecasts
US Euro Area UK International
ﬁscal policy CBO: European Commission: Ofﬁce for Budget
Responsibility:
Budget and Economic
Outlook
European Economic Forecast Economic and Fiscal
Outlook
monetary pol. FRB (staff): Eurosystem (staff): Bank of England:
Greenbook/Tealbook Monthly Bulletin (ECB + National
Central Banks)
Inﬂation Report
FOMC:
FOMC minutes
general Philadelphia Fed ECB IMF
Survey of professional
forecasters
ECB Survey of Professional
Forecasters
World Economic
Outlook
OECD
Economic Outlook
3.2 Forecasts for monetary policy purposes
In the following we provide a more detailed description of the production of forecasts at central
banks. We focus especially on the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, because we will
use those forecasts later on to check whether they inﬂuence actual policy decisions. A more general
though somewhat dated overview of forecasting practices at central banks is given in Robertson
13(2000).
Federal Reserve forecasts
The Federal Reserve publishes information on forecasts obtained via a regular poll of FOMC
members, which include the Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Presidents of the re-
gional Federal Reserve Banks, prior to FOMC meetings. The semi-annual monetary policy reports
to U.S. Congress (the so-called Humphrey-Hawkins reports) have presented information on the range
and central tendency of FOMC members’ forecasts since 1979. Since November 2007 the FOMC
has compiled and released these forecast ranges and central tendencies four times a year. The cen-
tral tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections. FOMC members are asked to
predict economic growth, the unemployment rate, and core and overall price inﬂation as measured by
the personal consumption expenditures deﬂator (PCE). Prior to 1998 the inﬂation forecasts concerned
the consumer price index (CPI). The FOMC members’ projections should be based on ”appropriate
monetary policy” that is deﬁned ”as the future path of policy that the participant deems most likely
to foster outcomes for economic activity and inﬂation that best satisfy his or her interpretation of
the Federal Reserve’s dual objectives of maximum employment and stable prices.”12 The horizon of
the forecasts used to be for the current and next year. Since November 2007, FOMC members are
asked to provide a projection for an additional year into the future as well as a long-run projection.
This long-run projection implicitly provides information on FOMC perceptions regarding long-run
potential growth, the natural unemployment rate and the FOMC’s desired long-run inﬂation rate.
In addition, the staff of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) in Washington, DC provides a forecast
of economic developments for every meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). This
document used to be called the Greenbook due to its green cover and is nowadays referred to as the
Tealbook.13 In contrast to the FOMC members’ projections, the FRB staff forecasts are conﬁdential.
They are only meant to inform the discussion among FOMC members. The forecasts are made avail-
able to the public with a ﬁve year lag. An online archive of past Greenbook data sets is available from
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
The forecasts are conditioned on a speciﬁc future path of the federal funds rate – the primary
policy instrument of the FOMC. It is often assumed that the federal funds rate will be kept constant
at the most recent level. At other times a decreasing or increasing path is assumed, especially if a
constant interest rate path would be implausible. We will discuss different conditioning assumptions
in detail in section 5.4.
As explained by Edge et al. (2010), Robertson (2000), and Reifschneider et al. (1997) the Federal
Reserve staff forecast is a judgmental projection that is derived from quantitative data, qualitative
information, different economic models, and various forecasting techniques. The forecast does not
12See, for example, Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee April 26-27, 2011, Summary of the Economic
Projections, Page 1.
13Until summer 2010 forecasts and monetary policy alternatives were summarized in two different documents: the Green-
book and the Bluebook. These are now merged in the Tealbook.
14result from a mechanical run of any large-scale macroeconometric model; nor is it derived directly
by add-factoring any such model. Instead, it relies heavily on the expertise of sector specialists and
senior advisers. The Federal Reserve’s structural macroeconomic model of the U.S. economy — the
so-called FRB/US model14 — is only one of the tools used as an input into the deliberations that lead
to the Greenbook/Tealbook projection. According to the above-mentioned descriptions of the FRB
staff forecasting process, FRB/US model forecasts are prepared at the same time as each Greenbook
forecast and for the same projection horizon. Furthermore, the model forecast is conditioned on the
same path for the federal funds rate as the Greenbook projection.
A forecast coordinator provides sector specialists with a set of conditioning assumptions and fore-
casts as a starting point. On this basis, staff economists that specialize on speciﬁc sectors create a ﬁrst
set of forecasts for a variety of economic variables. They might use a range of different statistical and
econometric techniques and models and expert knowledge. Furthermore, all regional Federal Reserve
Banks collect information on current regional conditions that are presented in the Beigebook and can
also help in forming a view about the current state of the U.S. economy. Additionally, econometric
methods that can process unbalanced data sets of differing frequency are used in creating an estimate
of current conditions, in other words, a nowcast that can serve as a starting point for forecasts. The
different assessments are aggregated with the help of the forecast coordinator and staff meetings into
projections for output, inﬂation and interest rates. Afterwards, individual sector forecasts are checked
to be consistent with these aggregate forecasts. This process goes on until sectoral and aggregate
forecasts converge (Reifschneider et al., 1997).
The Greenbook/Tealbook forecast contains a wide variety of variables that are grouped into
expenditure, employment and production, income and savings and prices and costs categories. There
are also detailed projections of federal sector accounts. Real GDP and CPI-inﬂation are projected
for major industrial and developing countries. The FRB/US model is used to compute conﬁdence
intervals around the judgmental point forecast and alternative scenarios for some key aggregates like
real GDP, the unemployment rate, and a core personal consumption expenditure price index. To this
end, the core model is add-factored in order to replicate the ﬁnal Greenbook point forecast over the
forecast horizon. The add-factored version of the model is then used for various exercises, such as
generating intervals around the Greenbook forecasts based on stochastic simulations and occasionally
for producing longer-run forecasts at horizons beyond two years.
European Central Bank forecasts
As to the euro area, the Eurosystem staff—that is the staff of the European Central Bank (ECB)
together with the staff of the euro area national central banks—-prepare macroeconomic projections
twice a year. Furthermore, the ECB’s staff prepares two additional projections per year so that euro
area projections are available at a quarterly frequency. These projections serve as an input to the ECB
Governing Council meetings and are made public afterwards in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. There is
no public information on the personal forecasts of members of the ECB Governing Council.
14See Brayton and Tinsley (1996) and Reifschneider et al. (1999) for descriptions of the FRB/US model.
15The joint forecasting process of ECB staff and national central banks’ (NCB) staff is described in
European Central Bank (2001). This joint group is called the Working Group on Forecasting (WGF)
and includes macroeconomic and econometric experts. They produce detailed macroeconomic projec-
tions under the responsibility and guidance of a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). This committee
consists of senior staff representatives of the ECB and the national central banks. National central
banks compute forecasts of GDP growth, its components, HICP inﬂation and the GDP deﬂator and
possibly other variables in their countries. Country forecasts are then aggregated to euro area forecasts
in a process that involves several types of consistency checks. The forecast rounds done solely by the
ECB staff are called macroeconomic projection exercises (MPEs) and the joint projections with the
national central banks are called BMPEs (broad MPEs).
This process involves three steps: (i) setting the assumptions underlying the exercise; (ii) a process
of overview at area-wide level with consistency checks and peer review of individual country results
that leads to a set of projection ﬁgures; (iii) preparation of a report for the Governing Council and the
publication of the forecasts in the ECB’s monthly bulletin.
With regard to conditioning assumptions, national central bank staff and ECB staff decide on a
joint set of exogenous time paths for interest rates, exchange rates, the international environment,
ﬁscal variables and commodity prices. In particular, paths for interest rates and commodity prices are
based on market expectations derived from futures rates.
Afterwards each national central bank computes a forecast for its country, whereas ECB staff pre-
pare a set of projections for the individual countries as well as for the euro area as a whole. The ECB’s
euro area projection is a consistent aggregation of its country assessments. The national central banks
use a variety of models, econometric methods and sectoral or country expertise. The combination of
model-based and judgemental-based information may also vary across countries.
Then an iterative process of consistency checking between the ECB’s area-wide forecast and the
aggregaton of the NCB forecasts is started. This process relies on meetings of NCB and ECB experts,
and importantly, also on analysis using the area-wide macroeconomic model of the ECB research
directorate.15 In addition, consistency checks are conducted with respect to trade volumes and prices
as well as ﬁnancial ﬂows and consolidated balance sheets of monetary ﬁnancial institutions in the euro
area.
The resulting Eurosystem staff projections serve as an input to the ECBs Governing Councils
meetings. Forecasts of variables that are published in the Monthly Bulletin include HICP inﬂation,
real GDP growth and its main components over for the current and the next year. The projections are
published in the form of uncertainty ranges corresponding to 57.5% probability bands.16 Ranges are
wider for longer forecast horizons reﬂecting the increased uncertainty. The ranges reﬂect uncertainty
due to unforeseeable shocks and imprecise parameter estimates as well as departures from the
15A description of the area-wide model is available in Fagan et al. (2005). In 2008 this model was replaced with a
New-Area-Wide model that is presented in Christoffel et al. (2008).
16By contrast, the ranges of FOMC forecasts published by the Federal Reserve indicate the level of disagreement between
FOMC member point forecasts rather than economic uncertainty bands.
16conditioning assumptions of the baseline forecast. In addition speciﬁc scenarios deviating from
the baseline conditioning assumptions are computed. For example, Eurosystem staff may compute
a forecast where the growth rate for the United States is assumed to be much lower than in the
baseline case or where the oil price is assumed to be higher. Many national central banks also publish
the projections for their economies. Forecasts are published together with a written statement that
explains economic developments and the surrounding uncertainty.
Inﬂation targeting central banks
At inﬂation-targeting central banks such as, for example, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the
Central Bank of Chile, the Bank of England, Sveriges Riksbank or the Bank of Norway the inﬂation
forecast takes center stage in the communication with the public. Their forecasts are not just staff,
but ofﬁcial forecasts. They are published and discussed regularly with the stated aim of inﬂuencing
and anchoring private sector expectations. For example, announcing a certain inﬂation target and
publishing an ofﬁcial forecast that illustrates that the central bank plans to do what is necessary to
reach that target can induce price setters to adopt this forecast in their considerations.
While the Fed Greenbook and the Eurosystem forecasts are associated with the staff and not
the policy makers, the ofﬁcial forecasts of inﬂation targeting central banks involve a much closer
collaboration of staff and policy makers. The reason is that the inﬂation forecast typically serves as an
intermediate policy target. In this context, the consequences of particular conditioning assumptions
need to be considered especially carefully. We will discuss their consequences more thoroughly in
section 5.4.
A thorough review of forecasting practices at inﬂation targeting central banks is beyond this chap-
ter.17 To pick an example, we review the procedures employed at the Bank of England. Of course,
there are differences in the forecasting processes employed by different inﬂation targeters. However,
all of them publish detailed inﬂation forecasts that reﬂect the views of policy makers in an ofﬁcial
document often called inﬂation report.
The published forecast of the Bank of England is the outcome of a joint forecasting process of
staff and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).18 In a series of meetings between the MPC and
the bank’s staff the forecasts are constructed, discussed and adjusted until they represent the views
of the MPC. The forecast involves judgment as well as a variety of economic models.19 The Bank
of England mainly employs a suite of ﬁve models. The core model has been replaced in 2005 by
the new Bank of England Quarterly Model (BEQM) (Bank of England, 1999, 2004). The suite of
17In this regard, the reader is referred to the chapter on inﬂation targeting in the forthcoming Handbook of Monetary
Economics by Svensson (2010).
18The MPC is the Bank’s main policy-making committee not to be confused with the MPC committee in the Eurosystem
which involves staff experts charged with producing a joint forecast for the consideration of euro area policy makers.
19In section 5.4 we will demonstrate a formal approach to include judgement or off-model information via conditioning
assumptions into structural model forecasts. Such a formal approach is used for example at the Central Bank of Norway
(Bache et al., 2010). At most central banks, however, the process of including judgement and conditioning assumptions is
less formal.
17models includes small-open economy New Keynesian structural models, small vector autoregression
models, single-equation regression models like Phillips curve models but also medium-scale dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models and larger-scale structural macroeconomic models.
The BEQM is a macroeconometric model that combines a DSGE model that is consistently derived
from microeconomic optimization behavior of households and ﬁrms with additional dynamics that
reﬂect short-run correlations not matched by the core DSGE model. The BEQM is the main tool
employed by the Bank of England staff and the MPC to construct the projections for the inﬂation
reports. It serves as a reference point to organize discussions about recent and projected economic
dynamics. However, the ﬁnal projections are not a mechanical output from the model, but include a
high degree of judgement by the MPC.
The Bank of England’s forecasts are presented as fan charts that represent uncertainty about
future economic developments and the conditioning assumptions. The forecast horizon is up to three
years ahead. The fan charts of the Bank of England offer more detail on the degree of uncertainty
than the Eurosystem forecasts. First, conﬁdence intervals are computed based on past forecast errors.
Then the MPC comments on these intervals and they are adjusted accordingly to reﬂect asymmetric
perceptions of upward and downward risks. In the case of upward risks, raising the interest rate would
become more likely, than when the MPC’s assessment points to symmetric uncertainty or downward
risks to the inﬂation forecast. The adjustment of the uncertainty bands by the MPC could be useful
to account for structural changes or additional variables not taken into account by the model and past
forecast errors.
International institutions
Other important forecasts that receive considerable attention by governments and the press are the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Economic Outlook. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook
includes analysis and projections of the main macroeconomic aggregates for all IMF member coun-
tries and is published twice a year. It is an integral element of the IMF’s surveillance process. The
OECD’s Economic Outlook is a similar publication that covers the OECD member countries and is
also published twice a year.
4 Empirical evidence that policymakers’ decisions respond to forecasts
Dopolicymakersadjusttheirdecisionsinresponsetochangesintheforecast? Answeringthisquestion
requires an empirical investigation. Of course, it is easiest to search for such a link in an environment
in which decision makers are exposed to a particular forecast on a regular basis and shortly thereafter
make a policy decision that immediately becomes public. Thus, it is most easily tested in the context
of central bank interest rate policy. We focus on the central banks in charge of the two most widely
used currencies, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. After reviewing ﬁndings
from the literature we conduct additional new empirical tests.
184.1 Federal Reserve interest rate decisions
Literature
Central bank policy in the United States is primarily concerned with setting a target for the federal
funds rate. Soon after Taylor (1993) showed that the federal funds rate path between 1987 and 1992
was matched very well by a simple rule that had been optimized in a model comparison exercise,
Federal Reserve staff started preparing Taylor rule charts as part of the regular information package
received by the FOMC (Kohn, 2007).20 These charts included rules with Taylor’s original coefﬁcients
on inﬂation and the output gap and rules with estimated coefﬁcients similar to those in Judd and
Rudebusch (1998). By 1997 this information also included rules based on (real-time) FOMC forecasts
of inﬂation and unemployment that were shown to exhibit a better empirical ﬁt than outcome-based
rules by FRB economists Lindsey, Orphanides and Wieland (1997).21 In 2007 William Poole, then-
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and member of the FOMC characterized the use
of the Taylor rule by the FOMC as follows:
“ The FOMC, and certainly John Taylor himself, view the Taylor rule as a general guide-
line. Departures from the rule make good sense when information beyond that incorpo-
rated in the rule is available. For example, policy is forward looking; which means that
from time to time the economic outlook changes sufﬁciently that it makes sense for the
FOMC to set a funds rate either above or below the level called for in the Taylor rule
which relies on observed recent data rather than on economic forecasts of future data. ”
(Poole (2007), (p. 6))
Many other studies have estimated Taylor-style rules using forecasts of U.S. data since the mid
1990s. Most of these studies included an interest rate smoothing term (cf. Clarida et al., 1998, 2000).22
Clarida et al. (2000), for example, compare forecast-based rules for the period before Paul Volcker’s
Fed chairmanship with the Volcker-Greenspan period using forecasts implied by U.S. data of 1997
vintage.
Many of the rules estimated in these studies are nested by following speciﬁcation:
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)[i∗ + β(Etπt+hπ − π∗)+γEtyt+hy]+ t, (11)
where it denotes the nominal interest rate, πt the rate of inﬂation and yt the output gap, which is
replaced with the unemployment rate in Lindsey et al. (1997) and Orphanides and Wieland (2008).
20One of the authors’ of this chapter (Wieland) was the staff economist responsible for updating this rules package
regularly for the FOMC from 1996 to 2000.
21This working paper was presented publicly at several occasions but not submitted for publication. It is available for
download from www.volkerwieland.com.
22Sack and Wieland (2000) discuss several reasons why central banks tend to smooth interest rates. Rudebusch (2002)
argues that a large and signiﬁcant interest rate smoothing coefﬁcient is the result of a misspeciﬁed monetary policy rule.
However, tests by English et al. (2003), Castelnuovo (2003) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004) provide further support for interest-
smoothing.
19Inﬂation and the nominal interest rate are measured at annual rates in percentage points. ρ,β and γ
denote the response parameters. π∗ is the inﬂation target and i∗ the equilibrium nominal interest rate
when inﬂation and output equal their respective target values.  t stands for a monetary policy shock
which captures deviations from the systematic policy response to output and inﬂation. The parameters
hπ and hy denote forecast horizons measured in quarters that correspond to the degree of forward-
lookingness of the central bank. The policy rule (11) also nests equations (2) and (3) from section
(2.2).
Table 2 reports estimation results from the above-mentioned studies for rules corresponding to
equation (11). Lindsey et al. (1997) identiﬁed a strong policy response to FOMC forecasts of inﬂation
and unemployment with coefﬁcients of 2.23 and -2.22 respectively. A rule-of-thumb for comparing
the unemployment response coefﬁcient with an output gap coefﬁcient using Okun’s law is to multi-
ply with -0.5, which would imply an output gap coefﬁcient near unity. Thus, the systematic policy
response to inﬂation and output forecasts is quite a bit larger than the response to recent outcomes
implied by the original Taylor rule coefﬁcients of 1.5 and 0.5 respectively. However, the interest-
rate-smoothing coefﬁcient of 0.38 implies that the funds rate only adjusts partially towards this policy
prescription within one quarter. Since FOMC forecasts were only produced semi-annually the esti-
mation of Lindsey et al. (1997) only uses two observations per year. The forecast horizon is three
quarters.23
Clarida et al. (2000) consider forecast horizons of 1 and 4 quarters for the rate of inﬂation, and a
horizon of 1 quarter for the output gap. They use quarterly data of 1998 vintage and identify forecasts
using generalized method of moments estimation.24 Clarida et al. (2000) ﬁnd that the interest rate
response to inﬂation during the pre-Volcker period, that is from 1960 to 1979 was not sufﬁcient to
achieve stabilization. It fails the so-called Taylor principle. An increase of inﬂation (expectations)
is followed by a less than one-to-one increase in the nominal interest rate and thus a decline in the
real interest rate. Such a decline in the real rate of interest would further stimulate economic activity,
generate additional output and further upward pressure on prices resulting in faster inﬂation. For the
Volcker-Greenspan era the inﬂation response coefﬁcient is larger than 1 and consequently satisﬁes
the Taylor principle. Over this period, the FOMC raised interest sufﬁciently in response to inﬂation
forecasts so as to ensure a stabilizing impact on inﬂation. The response to the four quarter ahead
inﬂationforecastisestimatedtobegreaterthantheresponsetotheonequarteraheadinﬂationforecast.
Orphanides (2001) points out that actual policy decisions are better captured by using the data
that was available to policy makers at that time. He analyzes the period from 1987-1992, the original
sample considered by Taylor (1993). In a ﬁrst step he compares interest rate rules for different forecast
horizons using ex post revised data. In this case, he ﬁnds that a speciﬁcation with contemporaneous
inﬂation and output gap estimates ﬁts the data best. In a second step Orphanides uses Greenbook
forecasts of inﬂation and the output gap to estimate the policy rule. With this real-time data speci-
23The exact derivation of the constant-three-quarter ahead forecasts from the available FOMC forecasts is discussed in
the next subsection.
24A possible justiﬁcation for the differential horizons is that output affects inﬂation with a lag.
20Table 2: Examples of estimated monetary policy parameters for different forecast horizons
Source sample hπ
1 hy
1 ρβγ
U.S.
Lindsey et al (1997): real-time 1988Q1-1996Q3 3 3 0.382 2.23 -2.223
Clarida et al. (2000) 1960Q1-1979Q2 1 1 0.68 0.83 0.27
Clarida et al. (2000) 1979Q3-1996Q4 1 1 0.79 2.15 0.93
Clarida et al. (2000) 1960Q1-1979Q2 4 1 0.73 0.86 0.34
Clarida et al. (2000) 1979Q3-1996Q4 4 1 0.78 2.62 0.83
Orphanides (2001): real-time 1987Q1-1992Q4 1 1 0.63 0.39 1.02
Orphanides (2001): revised 1987Q1-1992Q4 1 1 0.73 1.49 1.05
Orphanides (2001): real-time 1987Q1-1992Q4 4 4 0.56 1.62 0.82
Orphanides (2001): revised 1987Q1-1992Q4 4 4 0.95 3.72 2.96
Orphanides and Wieland (2008): real-
time
1988Q1-2007Q3 3 3 0.392 2.48 -1.843
Euro area
Gerdesmeier and Rofﬁa (2005): revised 1999Q1-2003Q1 4 0 0.814 0.64 1.44
Gerdesmeier and Rofﬁa (2005): real-time 1999Q1-2003Q1 4 0 0.984 2.13 1.63
Gerdesmeier and Rofﬁa (2005): real-time 1999Q1-2003Q1 8 0 0.954 1.87 1.70
Gorter et al. (2008): real-time 1997Q1-2006Q4 4 4 0.894 1.67 1.65
Gorter et al. (2008): revised 1997Q1-2006Q4 4 4 0.964 0.04 0.86
Gerlach (2007)5 1999Q2-2006Q2 4 4 -0.796 -0.607 2.208
Notes: 1 the forecast horizons hπ and hy always refer to a quarterly frequency regardless whether the data is monthly or quarterly.
2 The interest rate lag corresponds to two quarters rather than one quarter.
3 Lindsey et al. (1997) and Orphanides and Wieland (2008) use forecasts of the unemployment rate instead of the output gap. A
rule-of-thumb for comparing the unemployment response coefﬁcient with an output gap coefﬁcient using Okun’s law is to multiply
with -0.5.
4 The interest rate lag is one month rather than one quarter.
5 Gerlach (2007) estimates an ordered probit model so that the size of the parameters is not directly comparable to the other results in
the table. The equation includes in addition to the parameters in the table the lagged change in the interest rate and the exchange rate.
6 Reaction to a one month lagged interest rate rather than one quarter.
7 The negative inﬂation reaction found by Gerlach (2007) is not signiﬁcant.
8 Gerlach (2007) uses a measure of expected economic growth instead of the output gap.
ﬁcation he ﬁnds that policy rules with inﬂation and output gap forecasts ﬁt the data better than with
inﬂation and output gap nowcasts. In Table 2 we compare his results for one-quarter-ahead and four-
quarter-ahead forecasts with real-time and revised data. Estimates with revised data overestimate the
response to inﬂation. Estimates with one-quarter-ahead forecasts do not fulﬁll the Taylor principle.
However, the response to the four-quarter-ahead inﬂation forecasts is stabilizing with an estimated pa-
rameter higher than unity. Orphanides (2001) also considers other forecast horizons and ﬁnds that the
coefﬁcient on inﬂation increases with the horizon, while the coefﬁcient on the output gap decreases.
He notes that the forward-looking speciﬁcation captures the contours of the federal funds rate path
21considerably better.
Orphanides and Wieland (2008) have published updated and extended results regarding the
interest rate rules in the Lindsey et al. (1997) study with FOMC forecasts. They conﬁrm the earlier
ﬁnding of a strong response of the funds rate to FOMC inﬂation and unemployment forecasts.
Estimated values are surprisingly close to the Lindsey et al estimates with 10 years of additional data.
A rule with FOMC forecasts ﬁts the data much better than an outcome-based rule. We will analyze
and extend the the estimation of Orphanides and Wieland (2008) in more detail in the next subsection.
New empirical estimates
On the occasion of the January 2010 meeting of the American Economic Association, Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke discussed the implications of Taylor-style policy rules for monetary
policy during the housing bubble and the ﬁnancial crisis and stated:
“ ..., because monetary policy works with a lag, effective monetary policy must take into
account the forecast values of the goal variables, rather than the current values. Indeed,
in that spirit, the FOMC issues regular economic projections, and these projections have
been shown to have an important inﬂuence on policy decisions (Orphanides and Wieland
(2008))” (Bernanke, 2010, p. 8).
Thus, in the following we review and extend the Orphanides and Wieland (2008) study to shed
further light on the ﬁnding that FOMC policy is best described with an interest rate rule based on
FOMC forecasts. The range and a central tendency of the forecasts from the FOMC members are
available in the Humphrey-Hawkins reports which are presented in February and July of each year.
As noted earlier, there is no information available on the FOMC’s assessment of the output gap.
For this reason, Orphanides and Wieland (2008) use the unemployment rate forecasts of the FOMC
members as a measure of the level of economic activity. Assuming a constant NAIRU estimate,
which is subsumed in the regression intercept, the unemployment rate forecast captures anticipated
movements in the unemployment gap. Interestingly, Orphanides and Wieland (2008) also estimate
rules with the GDP growth forecasts of FOMC, but ﬁnd that the empirical ﬁt then deteriorates relative
to rules with the unemployment forecast.
The estimated rules require constant-horizon forecasts at the time of the policy decisions which
do not exactly correspond to the forecast horizon of the available FOMC forecasts. Constant horizon
forecasts are computed by appropriately averaging available FOMC forecasts and recent outcome
data. We illustrate the derivation of such constant-horizon forecasts in the context of our estimation of
forecast-based rules in the euro area in the next subsection. For the estimation with FOMC forecasts
we follow Orphanides and Wieland (2008) in comparing rules with three-quarter-ahead forecasts to
rules with outcomes from the preceding quarter, with and without interest rate smoothing. These rules
are nested in the following speciﬁcation:
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)[α + βEtπt+h + γEtut+h]+ t, (12)
22It corresponds to equation (11) for h =3and h = −1. The intercept term α = i∗ − βπ∗ − γu∗
includes the perceived equilibrium nominal interest rate, the inﬂation target and the perceived natural
unemployment rate.
Figure 1 displays the ﬁtted values of the rules with outcomes (dashed line) and forecasts (dotted
line) relative to the actual funds rate target (solid line) decided at each of the February and July FOMC
meetings from 1988 to 2010. The rules shown in the upper panel are estimated without interest-rate
smoothing (ρ =0in equation (12)), while the rules in the lower panel include an estimated degree
of interest-rate-smoothing (ρ>0). The parameters are estimated based on the sample from 1988 to
2007. The implications of the rules are then simulated forward using the FOMC forecasts up to the
end of 2010.
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
0
2
4
6
8
No Interest Rate Smoothing
Federal Funds Outcomes Forecasts
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
0
2
4
6
8
With Interest Rate Smoothing
Federal Funds Outcomes Forecasts
Figure 1: FOMC interest rate reaction functions: Outcomes vs FOMC forecasts
From the estimates without interest smoothing in the upper panel, it is directly apparent that
the prescriptions from the forecast-based rule are much closer to actual decisions than those from
the outcome-based rule. Not surprisingly, the interest rate rules with smoothing in the lower panel
are closer the actual funds rate path. Even so, the forecast-based rule continues to ﬁt better than
the outcome-based rule. Orphanides and Wieland (2008) identify ﬁve periods during which FOMC
forecasts provide a better explanation of policy decisions. Around 1988 and 1994 the FOMC raised
interest rates preemptively as it expected inﬂation to increase in the future. In those periods, the
23outcome-based rules respond more slowly, while the forecast-based rules ﬁt almost exactly.
In 1990/1991 and in 2001 the FOMC decreased interest rates as it expected a downturn of the
economy. The forecast-based rules capture this anticipation, while the ﬁt of the outcome-based rules
is not as good. Finally, in 2002/2003 the forecast-based policy rules indicate lower interest rates than
the outcome-based rules, consistent with actual policy. As explained by Orphanides and Wieland
(2008) the lower rate prescriptions are partly driven by a switch of the FOMC from forecasting CPI
inﬂation, to forecasting PCE and then core PCE inﬂation. The PCE forecasts at the time suggested
a threat of deﬂation. By contrast, private sector CPI forecasts would have implied higher interest
rate prescriptions throughout this period. In sum, these episodes provide further support for forecast-
based rules as a description of actual Federal Reserve Policy consistent with the earlier quotes of
FOMC members Ben Bernanke and William Poole.
Table 3: Interest Rate Rules with FOMC Forecasts of Inﬂation and Unemployment vs Outcomes:
1988-2007
no interest smoothing with interest smoothing
πt−1,ut−1 πt+3,ut+3 πt+3,ut−1 πt−1,ut−1 πt+3,ut+3 πt+3,ut−1
α 8.29 6.97 6.56 10.50 8.25 6.81
(6.14,10.79) (5.22,8.30) (5.60,7.61) (5.07,27.28) (6.73,10.24) (5.56,8.33)
β 1.54 2.34 2.20 1.29 2.48 2.23
(0.98,2.21) (2.02,2.57) (1.96,2.33) (-0.64,2.47) (2.14,2.65) (1.91,2.38)
γ -1.40 -1.53 -1.40 -1.70 -1.84 -1.46
(-1.91,-0.99) (-1.75,-1.22) (-1.60,-1.23) (-3.93,-0.79) (-2.17,-1.55) (-1.67,-1.26)
ρ 000 0.69 0.39 0.24
(0.24,0.91) (0.29,0.54) (0.04,0.45)
R2 0.75 0.92 0.94 0.85 0.96 0.95
¯ R2 0.74 0.91 0.94 0.84 0.96 0.95
Notes: Parameters are estimated using nonlinear least squares for the case ρ  =0 .9 5 % conﬁdence bands are
shown in brackets and are computed using a moving block bootstrap with 5000 repetitions and a block size
of 4 observations.
Table 3 reports the parameter values underlying the rules shown in Figure 1. In addition to
the estimation results in Orphanides and Wieland (2008), we report on a speciﬁcation that includes
inﬂation forecasts together with unemployment outcomes. Policy rules with forecasts of inﬂation and
outcomes of real economic activity have been considered in the literature because they account for the
conventional wisdom that monetary policy changes are transmitted more quickly to economic activity
than to inﬂation (see e.g. Bernanke and Mihov, 1998).
The parameter estimates indicate that all three speciﬁcations satisfy the Taylor principle. The
reaction to inﬂation is highest for the speciﬁcation with forecasts of inﬂation and the unemployment
rate and lowest for the purely outcome-based rule. The response to unemployment is negative and
quite large. For the speciﬁcations without interest rate smoothing the ﬁt in terms of R2 and ¯ R2 is
24lowest for the outcome-based rule and highest for the rule with a response to the inﬂation forecast
and unemployment outcome. For the speciﬁcations with interest rate smoothing the ﬁt is highest
for the purely forecast-based rule and lowest for the purely outcome-based rule. In the latter case
the parameters of the outcome-based rule are estimated with very large conﬁdence bands, while the
forecast-based rule is estimated much more precisely. Also, the degree of interest rate smoothing is
greater when using outcomes as regressors, which might be taken as a sign of misspeciﬁcation.
These ﬁndings provide evidence that the FOMC bases its interest rate decisions on inﬂation fore-
casts, but are not as clear-cut regarding unemployment. Without interest rate smoothing the ﬁt for a
rule with unemployment forecasts is very similar to the ﬁt of a rule with unemployment outcomes,
though with interest-rate smoothing the rule with unemployment forecasts ﬁts better. In order to fur-
ther test forecast- vs outcome-based rules we estimate the following speciﬁcation, which nests both
versions as limiting cases:
it = ρit−1 +(1−ρ)[α+β((1−φπ)πt−1 +φπEtπt+3)+γ((1−φu)ut−1 +φuEtut+3)]+ t, (13)
The new parameters φπ and φu indicate the relative importance of forecasts and outcomes of inﬂation
and the unemployment rate. We impose the following constraints in estimation: 0 ≤ φπ ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ φu ≤ 1. φπ =1 , for example, can then be interpreted as evidence that the Fed responds only to
inﬂation forecasts and not outcomes. Orphanides and Wieland (2008) impose φπ = φu = φ, while
we also allow these weights to differ. Table 4 reports the estimates obtained for φ, φπ and φu.
Table 4: The Relative Importance of Forecasts vs Outcomes: FOMC 1988-2007
no interest smoothing with interest smoothing
φπ = φu φπ  = φu φπ = φu φπ  = φu
φ 0.78 0.94
(0.55,0.84) (0.67,1.00)
φπ 0.87 0.93
(0.61,0.95) (0.65,1.00)
φu 0.32 1
(0.00,0.78) (0.35,1.00)
R2 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96
¯ R2 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96
Notes: Parameters are estimated using nonlinear least squares. The parameters φ, φπ and φu are restricted
to be in the range of 0 to 1. 95% conﬁdence bands are shown in brackets and are computed using a moving
block bootstrap with 5000 repetitions and a block size of 4 observations.
When restricting the two weights to be equal, we ﬁnd φ =0 .78 and φ =0 .94 , without and with
interest-rate-smoothing, respectively. The point estimates are close to one indicating that forecasts
are much more important than outcomes in explaining FOMC policy decisions. In both cases, the
95% conﬁdence bands do not include φ =0 . With interest rate smoothing, φ =1lies in the 95%
25conﬁdence band.25 Next, we allow for different weights on forecasts for inﬂation and unemployment.
In the absence of interest rate smoothing the weight on the inﬂation forecast increases further to
φπ =0 .87. The weight on unemployment forecasts decreases to φu =0 .32. This ﬁnding is in
line with earlier results that for speciﬁcations without interest rate smoothing a rule with inﬂation
forecasts and unemployment outcomes yields the best ﬁt. However, the speciﬁcation with interest rate
smoothing yields even a higher ¯ R2. In this case, the weight on inﬂation forecasts is φπ =0 .93 and
thus very close to 1. The 95% conﬁdence band includes 1, but not 0. Furthermore, the point estimate
for the unemployment forecast is on the upper bound: φu =1 . While the 95% conﬁdence band is
wider than for inﬂation, it excludes 0. The latter results provide further evidence that FOMC policy
decisions are based on forecast of inﬂation and unemployment rather than on outcomes.
In 2008, the Federal Reserve responded to the worsening of the ﬁnancial crisis by rapidly lowering
nominal interest rates towards near zero levels. Our out-of-sample simulation of forecast-based rules
estimated with data through 2007 going forward throughout 2008 captures this policy response fairly
well, though the initial decline in mid 2008 lags a bit behind actual decisions. Figure 2 displays
the simulation up to the end of 2010 relative to the actual funds rate target. From 2009 onwards the
FOMC has kept the funds rate at 25 basis points. Nominal interest rates cannot be lowered below
zero–at least deposit rates–because savers can instead use cash, which pays an interest rate of zero, to
store their savings. Since the economic outlook quickly deteriorated further at the end of 2008 and the
beginning 2009, the interest rates prescribed by the feedback rules moved far into negative territory.
As unemployment and unemployment forecasts increased drastically from about 6% to around 10%,
the rules, which exhibit coefﬁcients between 1.5 on outcomes and 2.3 on forecasts, suggested funds
rate targets as low as -2% to -5%, respectively.
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Figure 2: Outcome- vs FOMC Forecast-Based Rules: 2005-2011
With the funds rate near zero, the Federal Reserve did not abstain from further action, but instead
25We use a bootstrap algorithm to take account for the parameter restriction 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. As we bootstrap blocks of four
observations this allows in addition for serial correlation of the error term up to two years.
26took measures that led to a rapid expansion of its balance sheet, including in particular massive direct
purchases of assets such as government bonds and mortgage-backed securities, that are referred to as
credit and quantitative easing. These policy actions are best understood as a continuation of Federal
policy shifting from its usual policy instrument, the federal instrument, to quantity based instruments
when the funds rate reaches the zero lower bound. As proposed by Orphanides and Wieland (2000a)
policy can be understood as a rule for the quantity of base money when the nominal interest rate is
constrained at zero. The response coefﬁcients of such a rule need to be adjusted appropriately taking
into account parameters governing money demand and the degree of uncertainty about the effect of
quantitative easing on output and inﬂation. An empirical comparison of the quantitative easing in the
United States relative to the negative interest rates prescribed by the forecast-based policy rules would
be of great interest but is beyond the present study. Of course, simply extending the estimation of
the policy rule with 2009 and 2010 data without accounting for quantitative easing would incorrectly
result in a downward bias of the estimated interest rate response coefﬁcients.
4.2 ECB interest rate decisions
Literature
As demonstrated by Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) average interest rates in the EMU countries in
the period leading up to the formation of European Monetary Union (EMU), that is from 1990 to 1998
moved very closely with average output gaps and inﬂation as suggested by the Taylor (1993) rule. The
only exception noted by these authors was the period of the crisis of the European Monetary System
(EMS) in 1992–93.
By now there are several studies that assess to what extent actual ECB decisions can be described
by forecast- or outcome-based interest rate rules. Findings from several of these studies that are nested
by equation (11) are reported in Table 2. ECB economists Gerdesmeier and Rofﬁa (2005) provide
a comprehensive study comparing rules estimated with real-time and ﬁnal revised data of the euro
area as in Orphanides (2001). They use monthly euro area data from 1999 to 2003.26 Contrary to
Orphanides (2001) they ﬁnd that estimates based on ﬁnal revised data under-estimate the response
coefﬁcients. With real-time data Gerdesmeier and Rofﬁa (2005) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant response to survey
based expectations for inﬂation and real economic activity, but not to outcomes of these variables.
Thus, they provide evidence that that the ECB is setting interest rates in a forward-looking manner.
Gorter et al. (2008) use euro area Consensus Economics data for expected inﬂation and output
growth. They compare estimates of forecast-based policy rules to outcome-based policy rules with
monthly data from 1997 to 2006. They justify starting the sample in 1997 rather than in 1999 as
interest rate setting was coordinated during the run-up to the currency union. They ﬁnd that euro
area interest rates are better explained with responses to inﬂation and output growth forecasts than
26They use an average of ﬁve different output gap concepts: linear and quadratic trend measures, the HP Filter and
the output gaps provided by the OECD and the European Commission (both are production function approaches). To get
monthly output data they interpolate quarterly real GDP using a cubic spline.
27outcomes. The coefﬁcient on inﬂation in the outcome-based policy rule is not signiﬁcantly different
from zero. Thus, their analysis corroborates Gerdesmeier and Rofﬁa (2005) for a longer sample.
Gerlach (2007) estimates an ordered probit model on monthly data from 1999 to 2006 with mea-
sures of expected inﬂation and output growth taken from a poll of forecasters tabulated in ”The
Economist”. He ﬁnds that expectations of economic growth play an important role in explaining
the ECB’s interest rate decisions, but not those regarding inﬂation. To shed further light on potential
reasons for this ﬁnding, Gerlach (2007) constructs indicator variables from a word analysis of the
ECB’s assessment of economic conditions published in the ECB’s monthly bulletin. He argues that
the assessment in the ofﬁcial ECB report provides more accurate information about the Governing
Council’s view of the economy than external forecasts. He concludes from this analysis that the in-
ﬂation increases that occured over the sample were viewed to be temporary by the ECB and therefore
the Governing Council did not react to them with interest rate changes. By contrast, changes in output
were viewed by the ECB as an indicator of future inﬂation. Thus, it reacted strongly to them consistent
with a forecast-based approach to monetary policy. The negative interest rate smoothing coefﬁcient
in Gerlach’s ordered probit estimation has to be interpreted differently from the other studies that use
ordinary least squares and instrumental variable regressions. It reﬂects that the interest rate is not
adjusted every month. If the Governing Council decides to change the interest rate in one month the
likelihood of another adjustment in the next month decreases.
Other studies on euro area interest rate rules have been conducted by Foura ¸ns and Vranceanu
(2004, 2007), Hayo and Hofmann (2006), Carstensen (2006) and Sauer and Sturm (2007). Further
below, we will examine the role of euro area staff forecasts in explaining ECB interest rates. These
forecasts have not been used in any of the studies cited above.
New empirical estimates
Unfortunately, there are no publicly available ECB Governing Council projections for the euro
area. However, as discussed in section 3 ECB staff projections for key euro area variables are pub-
lished four times a year in the ECB’s monthly bulletin. The forecasts in March and September are
computed by the ECB’s staff and the forecasts for June and December by Eurosystem staff includ-
ing experts from the national central banks. These staff projections are available from December
2000 onwards. They are published as ranges reﬂecting uncertainty derived from past forecasting er-
rors and cover HICP inﬂation, real GDP, private consumption, government consumption, gross ﬁxed
capital formation, exports and imports. We have used the ECB staff forecasts of inﬂation and real
GDP growth to estimate forecast- vs outcome-based policy rules for the euro area similar to Or-
phanides (2001). Unfortunately, there is no data on output gap estimates or unemployment rates so
as to estimate rules in the spirit of Orphanides and Wieland (2008). An important caveat is that we
do not account for the ECB’s declared practice of cross-checking the results of its economic outlook
against medium-term monetary developments, the so-called monetary pillar of its strategy. Although
Beck and Wieland (2007, 2008, 2009) have proposed a formal framework for including a cross-check
against monetary trends in Taylor-style interest rate rules, a thorough empirical investigation is beyond
28the present chapter.
We estimate forecast-based and outcome-based policy rules nested by the following speciﬁcation:
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)[α + βEtπt+h + γEtyt+h]+ t. (14)
In doing so, we consider four-quarter-ahead forecasts, (h =4 ), and nowcasts, h =0 , for inﬂation and
output growth. As in the case of the FOMC projections, constant-horizon forecasts need be computed
by appropriately averaging available ECB staff forecasts of different horizons.
Table 5: Computation of 4-quarter-ahead forecasts and nowcasts
Inﬂation
December πt+4|t = πt+4|t πt|t = πt|t
March πt+4|t =0 .75πt+3|t +0 .25πt+7|t πt|t =0 .25πt+3|t +0 .75πt−1|t
June πt+4|t =0 .5πt+2|t +0 .5πt+6|t πt|t =0 .5πt+2|t +0 .5πt−2|t
September πt+4|t =0 .25πt+1|t +0 .75πt+5|t πt|t =0 .75πt+1|t +0 .25πt−3|t
Output Growth
December yt+4|t = yt+4|t yt|t = yt|t
March yt+4|t =0 .75yt+3|t +0 .25yt+7|t yt|t =0 .25yt+3|t +0 .75yt−1|t
June yt+4|t =0 .5yt+2|t +0 .5yt+6|t yt|t =0 .5yt+2|t +0 .5yt−2|t
September yt+4|t =0 .25yt+1|t +0 .75yt+5|t yt|t =0 .75yt+1|t +0 .25yt−3|t
Notes: Forecast horizons correspond to the end quarter of expected average annual inﬂation and output
growth rates.
ECB staff projections concern average annual percentage changes and are published for the pre-
vious year, the current year and the following year. The December projections also include a forecast
for the year after next year. As a result, the horizon of published projections varies over time. For
example, the forecast of average inﬂation next year that is published in December is a 4-quarter-ahead
forecast and denoted as πt+4|t. The forecast for next year published in September instead is a 5-
quarter-ahead forecast, πt+5|t. Constant-horizon forecasts may then be deduced as follows: (i) the
projections published in December have the right forecast horizon; (ii) the projections published in
September for next year (πt+5|t), and for the current current year, πt+1|t, can be appropriately aver-
aged to obtain a 4-quarter-ahead forecast, πt+4|t =0 .25πt+1|t +0 .75πt+5|t. Table 5 indicates how
to derive the 4-quarter-ahead forecasts and the nowcasts needed for the regression analysis from the
ECB staff forecasts published in the monthly bulletin in December, March, June and September.
The resulting parameter estimates for outcome- and forecast-based interest rate rules are reported
in Table 6.27 These estimates conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings in the literature that a rule based on outcomes of
inﬂation does not satisfy the Taylor principle. Unfortunately, the empirical ﬁt of rules without interest
27The interest rate used in the estimation is the repo target rate.
29rate smoothing is rather weak. Rules with interest-smoothing ﬁt better, but much of this improvement
is due to a high coefﬁcient on the lagged interest rate between 0.8 and 0.9. Among the rules with
interest rate smoothing, only the forecast-based rules satisfy the Taylor principle. Unfortunately the
estimates are not very precise and the inﬂation response coefﬁcient of the purely forecast-based policy
rule is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. However, both rules with inﬂation forecasts exhibit very
goodempiricalﬁtasmeasuredbytheR2 andreasonableparametervalues. Bycontrast, theparameters
of the outcome-based rule are even less precisely estimated and the inﬂation coefﬁcient is negative.
These results suggest that rules with forecasts of inﬂation better describe ECB policy than rules with
outcomes, but the ﬁndings are not as strong as in the case of the FOMC forecasts for the United States.
Table 6: Rules with ECB Forecasts of Inﬂation and GDP growth vs Outcomes: 2000-2010
no interest smoothing with interest smoothing
πt,yt πt+4,yt+4 πt+4,yt πt,yt πt+4,yt+4 πt+4,yt
α 1.54 0.02 1.09 9.38 -2.11 -2.48
(-1.86,3.13) (-1.68,1.67) (-0.14,2.48) (-2.10,30.30) (-6.11,0.54) (-4.75,0.59)
β 0.28 1.26 0.58 -4.64 1.64 2.48
(-0.55,1.48) (-0.10,2.08) (-0.34,1.18) (-17.42,1.19) (-0.08,2.52) (0.63,3.81)
γ 0.47 0.20 0.43 2.07 0.93 0.21
(0.16,0.94) (-0.38,1.32) (0.16,0.87) (0.40,6.71) (-0.04,2.93) (-0.15,1.11)
ρ 000 0.89 0.81 0.78
(0.62,0.99) (0.59,0.91) (0.50,0.90)
R2 0.63 0.46 0.65 0.94 0.95 0.94
¯ R2 0.61 0.44 0.63 0.93 0.95 0.94
Notes: Parameters are estimated using nonlinear least squares for the case ρ  =0 .9 5 % conﬁdence bands are
shown in brackets and are computed using a moving block bootstrap with 5000 repetitions and a block size
of 4 observations.
Figure 3 displays the ﬁtted values of the estimated forecast-based (dotted line) and outcome-based
(dashed line) policy rules relative to the actual path of euro area short term interest rates (solid line,
we use the repo rate target). Unfortunately, the empirical ﬁt is not as impressive as in the case of
the FOMC forecasts for the FOMC federal funds rate target in the United States. It is particularly
poor in the case of the rules without interest-rate smoothing which show big deviations from actual
policy decisions. By contrast, the rule with interest-rate smoothing follows actual interest rates very
closely. However, given that the interest rate changes only slowly it is not so surprising that a rule
with a high weight on last quarter’s interest rate would seem to ﬁt rather well. The graphical analysis
does not bring forth big differences between forecast-based and outcome-based rules with interest rate
smoothing.
Finally, we estimate again a speciﬁcation that allows for mixtures of forecast- and outcome-based
rules with the pure versions as limiting cases. It is deﬁned as follows:
it = ρit−1 +(1−ρ)[α+β((1−φπ)Etπt +φπEtπt+4)+γ((1−φy)Etyt +φyEtyt+4)]+ t, (15)
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Figure 3: Outcome- and forecast-based monetary policy rules: euro area
The estimation results for the parameters governing the mixture of forecasts and outcomes are
shown in Table 7. Again, the rules without interest rate smoothing exhibit poor empirical ﬁt. There-
fore we focus on the rules with interest rate smoothing. We ﬁnd for all these speciﬁcations point
estimates of φ = φπ = φy =1 . So, forecasts of inﬂation and output growth enter the policy rule,
while outcomes do not play a role. However, due to the short sample most 95% conﬁdence bands
cover the whole range from 0 to 1. Only the conﬁdence band for φy excludes 0, but includes 1. It is
clear that all estimates for the euro area have to be treated with caution because they are surrounded
by high uncertainty due to the short sample. Additional data is needed. However, the point estimates
suggest that forecasts of inﬂation and growth likely play a more important role for ECB decisions than
recent nowcasts.
While the empirical literature reviewed in this section as well as our own estimation results
provided overwhelming evidence that interest-rate setting at the Federal Reserve is conducted in a
forward-looking manner and also delivered some indications that it might also be true for the ECB,
these ﬁndings do not give an answer to the question whether forecast-based policy is desirable. Poole
(1971) notes that desirability of forecast-based policy certainly depends on the accuracy of the fore-
casts. Thus, we will investigate different technical procedures for computing forecasts in the next
section and then review the accuracy of such model-based forecasts together with expert forecasts
31Table 7: Policy Reactions to Forecasts and Outcomes: 2000-2010
no interest smoothing with interest smoothing
φπ = φu φπ  = φu φπ = φu φπ  = φu
φ 0.44 1.00
(0.00,0.78) (0.00,1.00)
φπ 0.42 1.00
(0.00,1.00) (0.00,1.00)
φy 0.48 1.00
(0.00,1.00) (0.12,1.00)
R2 0.67 0.67 0.95 0.95
¯ R2 0.63 0.63 0.95 0.95
Notes: Parameters are estimated using nonlinear least squares. The parameters φ, φπ and φu are restricted
to be in the range of 0 to 1. 95% conﬁdence bands are shown in brackets and are computed using a moving
block bootstrap with 5000 repetitions and a block size of 4 observations.
such as the Greenbook in section 5.6.
Furthermore, the simple framework for understanding the interaction of forecasts and policy pre-
sented previously in section 2.2 suggests that the relative performance of forecast- versus outcome-
based rules also depend on the structure of the economy. We will return to this question in section
6.
5 Computing forecasts that account for the interaction with policy de-
cisions
5.1 Forecasting models used at policy making institutions
Nonstructural time series models versus structural macroeconomic models
There are many purposes for producing forecasts at policy making institutions and their staff use
a variety of forecasting methods. Covering the full range of motives and techniques is beyond this
chapter. Furthermore, there are some important uses and techniques that we will not discuss in detail
because they are very well covered in other chapters of this Handbook.
For example, we do not review the nowcasting techniques used at policy institutions. The term
”nowcast” refers to the estimate of the current state of the economy. It constitutes a ﬁrst important
step in any forecasting exercise because macroeconomic data only become available with some time
lag. To give an example, the ﬁrst release of U.S. GDP is published late in the ﬁrst month following the
quarter it refers to and updated releases are published subsequently. Rather than relying only on GDP
numbers from earlier quarters, forecasters typically use other available information that is related to
economicactivitytoconstructanestimate. DatausedincludemonthlyseriesofGDPcomponentssuch
as industrial production or surveys and ﬁnancial variables such as stock prices that contain information
32on perceptions regarding business conditions and economic growth. Typically, nowcasts are computed
using non-structural time series models. They make it easier to incorporate high-frequency data.
Current techniques include linear projections, bridge equations and dynamic factor models. For a
more detailed review and applications of nowcasting techniques the reader is referred to the chapter
on ”Nowcasting with Daily Data” by Banbura et al. (2012).
Furthermore, simple non-structural time series models are widely used at policy institutions for
predicting future developments in key variables of interest. They yield forecasts that are not easy to
beat in terms of accuracy, in particular if they are initialized with efﬁcient nowcasts. We do not discuss
these forecasts in detail in this chapter because they cannot be used to assess the impact of planned
changes in policy that are systematic in nature. In other words, such forecasting approaches are sub-
ject to the Lucas critique. Nonstructural models assume that market participants respond to policy as
they did in the past. Thus, nonstructural forecasting techniques remain very useful for prediction in
environments where policy will continue to be conducted in the same manner as in the past. For an
exposition of different methods and a comparison of forecasting performance the reader is referred to
the chapter by Faust and Wright (2012) on ”Forecasting Inﬂation” in this Handbook. Recent compar-
isons of non-structural forecasting methods such as Bayesian VAR models with more sophisticated
structural approaches can be found in Edge et al. (2010) and Wieland and Wolters (2011).
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the use of structural macroeconomic models for
economic forecasting. These models incorporate explicit assumptions regarding the decision mak-
ing of monetary and ﬁscal policy makers concerning variables such as government spending, taxes,
transfers, central bank interest rates and central bank money. Furthermore, they provide characteri-
zations of the decision making and expectations formation of households and ﬁrms that indicate how
they will change their behavior in response to systematic changes in policy maker decisions. Thus,
model equations and parameters have an economic interpretation that imposes particular parametric
restrictions on the forecast relative to non-structural VAR models. In particular, we will use New
Keynesian models which incorporate nominal rigidities such as staggered wage and price contracts
that are important for analyzing short-run effects of monetary and ﬁscal policy.
We ﬁnd it useful to distinguish between ﬁrst- and second-generation New Keynesian models fol-
lowing Taylor and Wieland (2011) and Schmidt and Wieland (2012, in preparation). First-generation
models are characterized by nominal rigidities, rational expectations and policy rules. Second gen-
eration New Keynesian models developed from the late 1990s onwards explicitly implement all the
restrictions resulting from optimizing behavior of representative households and ﬁrms subject to con-
cretely speciﬁed constraints. They are typically referred to as New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models.
Small structural models typically consist of three to ﬁve equations representing key relationships
such as a Phillips curve, an IS- or aggregate demand curve and a monetary policy rule. Examples of
ﬁrst-generation small-scale New Keynesian models are Fuhrer and Moore (1995a), Fuhrer and Moore
(1995b), Fuhrer (1997) and Batini and Haldane (1999). Small-scale New Keynesian DSGE models
are presented by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Goodfriend and King (1997) and Woodford
33(2003).
Medium-size DSGE models used at policy institutions
In recent years many policy institutions have built medium-size DSGE models that offer fairly
detailed structural interpretations of the data. Such models are are also used more and more as a
central tool in the preparation of the main staff forecast at policy institutions.
For example, European Commission staff have been using a medium-size DSGE model with a
detailed ﬁscal sector named QUEST for the analysis of euro area ﬁscal stimulus and consolidation
policies (see Ratto et al. (2009) and Roeger and in ’t Veld (2010)). Staff of the International Monetary
Fund have developed a fairly large DSGE model, named GIMF, for the joint analysis of monetary and
ﬁscal policies (see Freedman et al. (2010)). Interestingly, the European Central Bank has replaced its
earlier, more traditional Area-Wide Model of Fagan et al. (2005) which featured largely backward-
looking dynamics, with a New-Area-Wide Model (see Christoffel et al. (2008)) of the DSGE variety in
the ECB staff forecasting process.28 The Federal Reserve makes use of the FRB/EDO model of Edge
et al. (2008),29 though the FRB-US model still remains its principal model for policy analysis. DSGE
models used at other central banks include the ToTEM model of the Bank of Canada (Murchison
and Rennison, 2006; Fenton and Murchison, 2006) and the RAMSES model used at the Swedish
Riksbank (Adolfson et al., 2007b, 2008). All these models build on the medium-size DSGE model
of Christiano et al. (2005). Christiano et al extended the simple New-Keynesian DSGE model and
showed that such a medium-size DSGE model can match the VAR-based estimate of a monetary
impulse response function. Typically, these models are estimated instead with Bayesian estimation
methods as proposed and exempliﬁed by Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). In this manner they are
able to explain the dynamics of a large number of macroeconomic times series.
An appealing feature of DSGE models is that they implement all restrictions arising from
optimizing behavior of households and ﬁrms subject to clearly speciﬁed constraints. Thereby they
go further in addressing the Lucas critique and offer useful input for ﬁscal and monetary policy
making. DSGE models are less ﬂexible than ﬁrst-generation New Keynesian models in terms of
freely introducing additional lags of endogenous variables to capture empirical dynamics. This lack
of ﬂexibility is typically made up for by introducing unrestricted serial correlation in the economic
shock processes. The economic shocks themselves are typically derived within the context of
microeconomic foundation and more meaningful than shocks that are simply added to behavioral
equations as in some of the earlier-generation New Keynesian models. However, the unrestricted
28In addition, the model of Christiano et al. (2008), which includes a more detailed ﬁnancial sector also plays an important
role. The use of both models at the ECB is described in Smets et al. (2010)
29The FRB-EDO features two production sectors, which differ with respect to the pace of technological progress. This
structure can capture the different growth rates and relative prices observed in the data. Accordingly, the expenditure side is
disaggregated as well. It is divided into business investment and three categories of household expenditure: consumption of
non-durables and services, investment in durable goods and residential investment. The model is able to capture different
cyclical properties in these four expenditure categories. The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques on eleven time
series.
34serial correlation of these shocks is similarly ad-hoc as lags of endogenous variables in the earlier
models. Even so, this feature has quickly been popularized in policy applications. The estimated
degree of serial correlation importantly contributes to the forecasting power of the DSGE models.
Several studies have shown that estimated DSGE models can generate forecasts of reasonable
accuracy (Smets and Wouters, 2004; Adolfson et al., 2007a; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Edge et al.,
2010; Wang, 2009; Christoffel et al., 2010; Wieland and Wolters, 2011).
Large-scale macroeconomic models used at policy institutions
Many policy making institutions use even larger-scale models that contain many additional vari-
ablesofinteresttothoseinstitutions. TheInternationalMonetaryFundandtheEuropeanCommission,
for example, have large multi-country models at their disposal. Another well known example is the
FRB/US model that has been used at the Federal Reserve since 1996 and contains many more data se-
ries for the U.S. economy than standard DSGE models. Typically, these models are not fully-ﬂedged
DSGE models. They may contain many additional ad-hoc speciﬁcations as in the earlier-generation
New Keynesian models.
The FRB/US models has been documented in Brayton and Tinsley (1996) and Reifschneider et al.
(1999). Individual equations or equation blocks are based on economic theory and inspired by the
optimization problems of households and ﬁrms. However, they do not systematically enforce the
restrictions implied by optimizing behavior subject to constraints as is done in DSGE models. The
model aims to provide a good balance between data ﬁt and economic theory. For example, the lag
structure of adjustment cost processes is chosen to provide a good ﬁt to the data and therefore polyno-
mial adjustment processes are added to most equations (see Tinsley, 1993, for more details). While the
equations can be interpreted structurally, the addition of polynomial adjustment cost processes makes
this more difﬁcult (Taylor, 1997). It contains—depending on the speciﬁc version—50 stochastic equa-
tions that describe the economic behavior of different agents and 300 identities that deﬁne additional
variables. By contrast, the FRB/EDO model—a DSGE model that has been developed at the Fed—
contains only 11 observable and about 60 equations where most variables are treated as unobservable
and are determined via the application of the Kalman Filter to the state space representation of the
model.
One of the advantages of large econometric models is that they contain all important macroe-
conomic aggregates. For example, FRB/US model breaks down aggregate demand into private con-
sumption, ﬁxedinvestment, inventoryinvestment, netexportsand governmentpurchases. These broad
categories are disaggregated even further. For example, spending on ﬁxed investment is separated
into equipment, nonresidential structures and residential construction. Government spending is di-
vided into six sub-components. Aggregate supply is also disaggregated. Potential output is modeled
as a function of the labor force, crude energy use, and a composite capital stock, using a three-factor
Cobb-Douglas production technology. While variables are assumed to move gradually to eliminate
deviations from equilibrium values, they also respond to expected future equilibrium values. Expecta-
tions are also important in the ﬁnancial sector. The long-term interest rate equals expected future short
35rates and a term premium. Real stock prices equal discounted expected future dividend payments. To
estimate the model expectations are assumed to be formed by small VARs. However, for simulations
one can choose whether to use the VAR-based expectations or a fully rational expectations based
version.
The forecasting accuracy of the FRB/US model and the Fed’s DSGE model (FRB/EDO) has been
compared in Edge et al. (2010). Overall, the FRB/EDO model yields more precise forecasts, probably
due to its more parsimonious parametrization. However, the forecasts from both models regarding
key variables such as inﬂation are less accurate than the Greenbook forecasts. The superiority of the
Greenbook forecasts may be due to the judgement used and information gleened from other sources
than the data series used by the models.
In the following, we will show how to employ structural models for identifying the sources of
predicted dynamics of key macroeconomic variables and for interpreting forecasts. Since policy mak-
ers frequently request forecasts that are conditioned on particular plans for certain policy instruments,
we will review techniques for computing such conditional forecasts. In doing so we show how to in-
clude judgment in model-based forecasts. Furthermore, we compare forecasts from smaller and larger
models with other available forecasts and assess forecast accuracy. For a detailed technical presenta-
tion of the steps that need to be taken to produce forecasts with estimated structural macroeconomic
models we refer the reader to the chapter on ”DSGE Model-Based Forecasting” by Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2012) in this Handbook. Furthermore, we would like to make the reader aware of a new
model database and computational platform that makes small- medium- and even large-scale models
available to the public and allows individual researchers to evaluate models developed and used at
policy institutions (see Wieland et al. (2012) and www.macromodelbase.com).
5.2 Forecasts from a small structural model: IMF’s small quarterly projection model
We start by deriving forecasts from a particular small-scale structural New Keynesian model.
The IMF’s small quarterly projection model of the U.S. economy (Carabenciov et al., 2008)
belongs to the ﬁrst generation of New-Keynesian models. It is a closed economy model that
captures the dynamics of output, inﬂation, a short term interest rate and the unemployment rate.
According to the authors it offers a simple but plausible structure suited to forecasting and policy
analysis at policy institutions. The main policy instrument considered is the central bank interest
rate. It does not include ﬁscal variables. Similar models calibrated for different countries are cur-
rently used at several country desks at the IMF to help structure the dialogue with member countries.30
The model
The core of the model consists of an IS-equation, a Phillips curve, a monetary policy rule and a
30See p. 7 of (Carabenciov et al., 2008) for more references.
36version of Okun’s law relating unemployment to the output gap:
yt = β1yt−1 + β2Etyt+1 − β3(it − Etπt+1) − θηt +  
y
t, (16)
πt = λ1Et˜ πt+4 +( 1− λ1)˜ πt−1 + λ2yt−1 −  π
t , (17)
it =( 1 − γ1)[γ2(Et˜ πt+3)+γ3yt]+γ1it−1 +  i
t, (18)
ut = α1ut−1 + α2yt +  u
t , (19)
BLTt = ¯ BLTt − kEtyt+4 +  BLT
t , (20)
ηt =
9  
i=1
ki BLT
t−i . (21)
All variables are expressed in terms of deviations from equilibrium values. Certain equilibrium
values are modeled as stochastic processes (not shown), for example, potential output is driven by
permanent level shocks as well as highly persistent shocks to its growth rate. Thus, yt, which denotes
output, is the deviation of the level of output from potential, that is the output gap.
The IS equation (16) relates the output gap to one lag and one lead of itself, the real interest rate,
it − Etπt+1, bank lending conditions indicated by ηt, and a demand shock,  
y
t. The Phillips curve
equation (17) relates the quarterly inﬂation rate πt, to the past and expected future four-quarter moving
average of inﬂation (i.e. the year-on-year rate),˜ πt, the lagged output gap and a cost-push shock,  π
t .
The interest rate rule (18) describes the determination of the short-term nominal interest rate it in
response to the lagged rate, the output gap and deviations of inﬂation from target (normalized at zero)
as well as a monetary policy shock  i
t. The equation for unemployment (19) is a version of Okun’s
law, linking the deviation of the unemployment rate from the equilibrium unemployment rate, ut,t o
the output gap.
The model exhibits inertia in output and inﬂation dynamics and short-run real effects on
monetary policy. In the long run, monetary policy only determines inﬂation. A novel feature of the
model is the inclusion of linkages between ﬁnancial intermediation and business cycle dynamics.
Equations (20) and (21) serve to measure the degree of bank lending tightness, BLTt, that impacts
on aggregate demand. The corresponding empirical measure is obtained from survey answers
regarding ﬁnancial conditions from the Federal Reserve Board’s quarterly Senior Loan Ofﬁcer
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices. Banks are assumed to adjust their lending practices
around an equilibrium value, ¯ BLTt, depending on their expectations about the real economy four
quarters ahead and a ﬁnancial shock  BLT
t . The equilibrium value of bank lending conditions
follows a random walk. Banks are assumed to ease their lending conditions during economic
upturns and tighten them during downturns. To link bank lending conditions to the real economy
the lagged 8-quarter moving average of the ﬁnancial shocks, ηt, enters the aggregate demand equation.
Forecasts
We have re-estimated the IMF projection model using U.S. data for real GDP, the CPI, the federal
funds rate, the unemployment rate and bank lending conditions (BLT) from 1994Q1 to 2007Q4. Our
37parameter estimates are very similar to those of Carabenciov et al. (2008). We have computed fore-
casts for all variables in the model including the unobservable equilibrium or natural values. The ﬁrst
set of forecasts uses information up to 2008Q1. Then, we add data realizations sequentially and com-
pute a set of forecasts up to four quarters ahead. We focus on point forecasts disregarding potential
data revisions.
Figure 4 compares the forecasts (thin blue lines) for quarterly real GDP growth, quarterly CPI in-
ﬂation, the federal funds rate and bank lending conditions to subsequent data realizations (thick black
lines). Despite its ﬂexible formulation with various lags and permanent as well as temporary shocks,
the IMF model has difﬁculties predicting output growth during the ﬁnancial crisis and recession. Note,
this is not a particular shortcoming of structural model forecasts but also applies to non-structural time
series models and professional forecasts available from surveys. Perhaps, it is somewhat disappoint-
ing that the inclusion of data on bank lending tightness in the model does not help much in improving
forecasts of the recession triggered by the ﬁnancial crisis. On the positive side, forecasts are quite
accurate from 2009Q1 onwards and capture the initial recovery process surprisingly well.The initial
recovery during 2009 and 2010 is predicted to be followed in the next year by growth rates broadly in
line with average growth, which is estimated to be 2.6% in the sample.
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Figure 4: Quarterly GDP growth, CPI inﬂation, federal funds rates and bank lending conditions: Data (thick black line) and forecasts
(thin blue lines)
Themodelcorrectlypredictsinﬂationtofallduringtherecession, butitfailstocapturetheextreme
decline in the fourth quarter of 2008. From 2009 onwards inﬂation projections are fairly precise. The
projections of the federal funds rate explain why output growth estimates during the recovery turn
out too optimistic. The model forecast does not enforce the zero bound on nominal interest rates.
It allows rates to turn negative thereby incorporating too much stimulus to output. Imposing the
38zero-interest-ﬂoor on nominal interest rates would have resulted in less optimistic output forecasts.
We will demonstrate a simple procedure for adjusting forecasts to take into account the zero-lower-
bound in section 5.4. We will discuss forecast accuracy during recessions in more detail in section 5.6.
Unobservable variables and forecast interpretation
The structural model includes unobservable variables such as potential output growth that help
users interpret the economic forces driving the forecast. For example, the longer-term impact of the
ﬁnancial crisis on GDP may be judged by forecasts of the level and growth rate of potential output.
Figure 5 displays actual versus potential output and actual versus natural unemployment rates
over the whole sample together with an out-of-sample forecast for 2011 and 2012. Potential output
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Figure 5: Actual vs potential GDP and actual vs natural unemployment rate.
growth is ﬁrst estimated to slow down around 2001 followed by a more severe slowdown in 2008. The
growth rate of potential GDP is projected at about 0.5% at the end of the sample. While the output gap
(not shown) is still in negative territory in 2010Q4, it is projected to turn slightly positive in 2011, and
remain near zero throughout 2012. Thus, it indicates no inﬂationary pressure from aggregate demand.
Accordingly, year-on-year output growth is projected to slow down in 2012 towards 1.5 percent. This
forecast is about 1 percentage point lower than the forecast we have obtained from non-structural time
series models (not shown).
Relative to the estimated changes in potential output, the up-ward trend in the natural unemploy-
ment rate or NAIRU seems less extreme. It is projected at 7 percent by 2011. Thus, it explains only
a smaller part of the increase in the unemployment rate. The model predicts unemployment to de-
cline towards 8.40 percent by the end of 2011, which is slightly below the forecast we obtained from
non-structural models (not shown).
This example shows that a structural model can help interpreting the forecast by projecting
39unobservable equilibrium-related concepts such as potential output and the natural rate. Of course,
one might ask, what are the economics behind the sizeable impact on potential growth. While the
assumed non-stationary stochastic process adds ﬂexibility to the model, the model remains silent
on the question to what extent the slowdown is due to lower capital utilization, a period of reduced
investment or a preference shift towards leisure. Answers to such questions could be obtained from
the type of medium-size DSGE model we will discuss in the next subsection.
Structural shocks and forecast interpretation
Another unobservable element of structural models is given by the economic shocks. Structural
shocks differ from estimation residuals. They require identiﬁcation via parametric restrictions. Fur-
thermore, in models with forward-looking terms identifying structural shocks requires computing the
expectation of future variables so as to separate out the forecast error. Structural shocks may be inter-
preted as meaningful economic disturbances. Of course, the extent of useful interpretation depends
on the economic foundations for the parametric restrictions in the model. Since the IMF projection
model is not strictly micro-founded some of these shocks have little concrete interpretation. Even so,
distinguishing aggregate demand shocks in the IS curve from cost-push shocks in the Phillips curve
and long-run supply shocks to potential output, helps understanding whether inﬂation is primarily
driven by demand-pull factors, short-run cost-push shocks or productivity changes that may be related
to technological improvements.
Figure 6 display the estimated series of structural shocks. The sequence of negative demand
shocks between 2008 and 2010 indicates that according to this model an unexpected shortfall of
demand (i.e. the shocks) caused an unexpected decline in GDP. Furthermore, the sequence of positive
monetary policy shocks in 2009 indicates that interest rates where higher than expected based on
the policy rule, and therefore represented an additional cause for an unexpected decline in GDP. The
sequence of negative shocks to potential GDP growth and the sequence of positive shocks to bank
lending tightness also contribute to the unexpected drop in GDP.
In sum, these shocks reﬂect again the inability of the model to forecast the recession, but they
help point to sources of the unexpected shortfall. The forecasting power of the model arises from pre-
dictable endogenous dynamics such as lags of output, inﬂation or interest rates, and from predictable
exogenous dynamics such as the persistence of the bank lending tightness shocks. The sequence of
positive monetary policy shocks in 2009 may be due to the omission of the zero bound. Including this
constraint may therefore improve the forecasting performance.
The large positive cost-push shock in 2008Q4 reﬂects the failure of forecasting the decline in
inﬂation since this shock enters the Phillips curve negatively. According to this model the drop in
inﬂation is largely due to a sudden decline in costs and to a lesser extent to the disinﬂationary impact
of a shortfall of demand. Thus, without using data on energy prices the model indicates that the
decline of energy costs was largely behind the drop in inﬂation in 2008Q4. A sequence of positive
shocks to unemployment in 2010 represents a source of unexpectedly high unemployment at the end
of the recession according to this model.
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Figure 6: Estimated shocks in the IMF’s quarterly projection model.
Finally, one can explore the parameter estimates of the model to gauge the importance of differ-
ent channels of inﬂuence in determining the forecast. One could also re-estimate the model for each
forecast to investigate whether certain parameter values change a lot over time and thus spot structural
changes. Here, we only point out the parameters governing the shock process to potential output.
The estimates show that each quarter potential output growth equals 0.93 times the previous potential
output growth rate plus 0.07 times steady state growth. It thus takes a long time until potential output
growth returns back to steady state. On the other hand, the estimation results show that the estimated
variance of the growth rate of potential output is relatively high. In Figure 6 the lower right panel
shows shocks to the potential output growth rate. A series of highly negative shocks led to the current
extremely low estimates of potential output growth. Given the high variance of this shock series po-
tential output could quickly adjust back to higher equilibrium growth rates once actual output growth
increases.
5.3 Forecasts from a medium-scale New-Keynesian DSGE model for monetary and
ﬁscal policy analysis
Brief Model Description
In the following, we will produce and interpret forecasts using a medium-scale DSGE model es-
timated in Cogan et al. (2010). Cogan et al. extended the Smets and Wouters (2007) model of the
U.S. economy by introducing a share of households that consume current income. As a consequence,
the model does not anymore exhibit Ricardian equivalence. The path of taxes and debt is not irrel-
evant. Tax and debt dynamics are modeled explicitly. Such an extension was proposed by Gal´ ı and
Lopez-Salido (2007) in the context of a small New Keynesian model in order to better understand the
41consequences of ﬁscal policy, speciﬁcally changes in government purchases. Cogan et al. (2010) use
this model to analyze the interaction of monetary policy and the U.S. ARRA ﬁscal stimulus at interest
rates near the zero-lower bound. In the following, we refer to this model as the CCTW-SW model.
The CCTW-SW model contains a large number of frictions and structural shocks. Physical
capital is included in the production function and capital formation is endogenous. Labor supply
is modeled explicitly. Nominal frictions include sticky prices and wages and inﬂation and wage
indexation. Real frictions include consumption habit formation, investment adjustment costs and
variable capital utilization. Utility is nonseparable in consumption and leisure. There exist ﬁxed costs
in production. The aggregator by Kimball (1995) is used which implies a non-constant elasticity of
demand. The model includes equations for consumption, investment, price and wage setting as well
as several identities. It contains seven structural shocks and it is ﬁt to seven time series. Among the
shocks are, total factor productivity, risk premium, investment-speciﬁc technology, wage mark-up,
price mark-up, government spending and a monetary policy shock. All shock processes are serially
correlated. Cogan et al. (2010) estimate a posterior mean of 26.5% of rule-of-thumb consumers and
feedback equations for taxes that ensure a return to the steady-state debt to GDP ratio. A complete
list and description of the equations is contained in appendix A.
Forecasts
We have re-estimated the model with data from 1965Q3 to 2007Q4. On this basis, we have
computedforecastsforallvariablesinthemodelincludingunobservableconceptslikepotentialoutput
and the natural rate of interest. We compute a sequence of forecasts starting in 2008Q1 by adding
subsequent data realizations sequentially up to the ﬁnal set of forecasts as of 2011Q1. Again, we
focus on point forecasts.31
Figure 7 displays forecasts for quarterly real output growth, consumption, investment, quarterly
inﬂation32 (annualized) and the federal funds rate.
The output growth forecasts are roughly similar to those computed with the small structural IMF
31We neglect that data revisions and current quarter observations are not observable when computing a forecast. We take
the same data series and transform them in the same way as in Smets and Wouters (2007) with one exception: the hours per
capita series. This series is non-stationary (see e.g. Chang et al., 2007) and it is inﬂuenced by low frequency movements
in government employment, schooling and the aging of the population that cannot be captured by a simple DSGE models.
Thus, we follow Francis and Ramey (2009) and remove these trends by computing deviations of the hours per capita series
using the HP ﬁlter with a weight of 16000 (compared to the standard weight of 1600 used for business-cycle frequency
de-trending). Without this additional data treatment the Smets & Wouters model yields an unreasonable output gap that is
largely negative for most parts of the sample. For each forecast we apply the HP-Filter only until the forecast starting point
to prevent that this two-sided ﬁlter uses information about data points in the future.
32The inﬂation rate is not directly comparable to the IMF model because the IMF model uses the CPI inﬂation rate, while
the Smets & Wouters model uses the GDP deﬂator. To solve the problem that DSGE models contain only a very limited set
of variables Schorfheide et al. (2010) propose to use auxiliary equations to link non-modeled variables to the state variables
in the model. Predictions for the non-core variables are obtained by applying their measurement equations to DSGE model-
generated forecasts of the state variables. In this way one can base forecasts of these non-core variables (including different
deﬁnitions of inﬂation) on the structural representation of the model.
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Figure 7: Real GDP growth, consumption growth, investment growth, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate: Actual (black line) and
forecasts (blue lines).
model in the previous section. There is a strong comovement of output, consumption and investment.
The ﬂuctuations of investment growth are much larger than those of consumption growth. The model
cannot predict the large recession in 2008/2009 and tends to predict a relatively quick return to the
balanced growth path in 2008Q3 while the recession actually deepened. Once the turning point has
been reached in 2008Q4 the recovery is predicted quite well. Forecasts are quite accurate from 2009
onwards even though growth turned out to be somewhat lower in 2010 than predicted by the model.
The forecast for investment growth is very persistent. Investment is predicted slightly below 12
percent for 2011. Afterwards, it is expected to decrease slowly to a substantially lower steady state
rate of about 2.4 percent, similar to GDP.33
The model cannot predict the spikes in inﬂation in 2008 and overpredicts inﬂation from 2009 to
the end of 2010. The steady-state inﬂation rate is estimated to be 2.5% and thus higher than the most
33The high degree of persistence may be explained by the discrepancy between the average output growth rate and the
much higher average investment growth rate observed in the data. The model enforces the same steady state value and
introduces persistence in investment to ﬁt actual data series.
43recent data observation. Accordingly, the model predicts increasing inﬂation rates reaching 1.8% in
2011 and 3% in 2012.
Federal funds rate forecasts violate the zero-lower bound in 2009. The difference of the model
relative to the actual funds rate setting at 25 basis points manifests itself also in adverse monetary
policy shocks. In contrast to the IMF model the steady state interest rate is ﬁxed and the interest rate
forecast always predicts a return to the steady state.
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Figure 8: The ﬁgure shows the model consistent output gap and the level of real GDP and real potential GDP. Values after 2011 are
forecasts. While real GDP is observable, the output gap and potential output are derived via the Kalman Filter.
Figure 8 shows actual real GDP relative to potential and the resulting output gap estimate.
Values after 2011 are forecasts. Between 2005 and 2008 the output gap is positive. In 2009 it turns
negative because real GDP declined, while potential output still increased. In 2010 the output gap
comes close to zero as real GDP grew again and potential output declined. The forecast for the output
gap is slightly above zero as real GDP is predicted to grow somewhat faster than potential GDP.
In this model potential GDP and the output gap have a clear structural interpretation. While in the
previous small structural model potential GDP was modeled as a trend, it is deﬁned in the DSGE
model as the level of output and expenditure that would be realized in the absence of price and wage
rigidities and price and wage mark-up shocks.
Decomposition in structural shocks for forecast interpretation
To analyze which shocks played an important role during the ﬁnancial crisis and recession, and to
investigate which of them have a lasting impact over the forecast period, we derive a decomposition.
Using the moving average representation of the model solution, we evaluate how much each type of
shock contributes to a particular variable at each point in time over the sample and forecast periods.
The model contains seven shocks: a risk premium shock, investment-speciﬁc technology shock, gen-
eral technology shock, monetary policy shock and price and wage mark-up shocks. Figure 9 displays
44the decomposition of quarterly output growth (annualized). The bars for each period summarize the
contributions of all shocks to output growth, some of them positive some negative. The areas with
different textures identify the size of the contribution of each type of shock.
In addition to the shocks, the label of the chart refers to two more contributions to growth termed
”starting values” and ”population growth”. The bars labeled starting values appear because data is
not available for an inﬁnite past history, and therefore shock realizations cannot be recovered from an
inﬁnite past. Thus, the ”starting values” bar indicates the impact of the initial conditions. Their effect
is negligible over the period shown in Figure 9.
DSGE models are usually deﬁned in per capita terms. However, policy makers are more interested
in aggregate growth rates. Therefore, the black solid-line indicates overall real GDP growth rather
than per capita growth. Consequently, part of the GDP growth is due to population growth. This
contribution is indicated by the ”population growth” bars. As population growth is not deﬁned in
the model, we simply assume that the population continues to grow at the rate observed in 2009 and
2010. The horizontal axis indicates the steady-state per capita growth rate. For long-run forecasts the
impact of the shocks will disappear and per capita growth will converge to this estimate of steady state
growth.
Figure 9: The ﬁgure shows a historical decomposition of annualized quarterly real output growth. The vertical line in 2011 indicates
that values afterwards are forecasts. The black line show the output growth rate and the bars show the contribution of the different shocks,
the population growth rate and initial values. The sum of the bars equals the output growth rate.
45The positive and negative contributions from shocks, population growth and initial conditions
sum up to the actual output growth rate (black line) over the sample period and to the predicted output
growth rate over the forecast period. Interestingly, the deep recession of 2008 and 2009 is largely
attributed to the combination of substantial (positive) risk premium shocks and negative investment
shocks. The contribution of these two types of shocks is lumped in the left shaded area of the contri-
bution bars.
In other words, the recession, which was not predicted by the model, is explained as being due
to a sequence of unexpectedly high risk premia realizations together with unexpected shortfalls of
investment demand. To the extent these shocks are estimated to persist, they also help predict future
growth. Thus, even though the model does not utilize ﬁnancial data other than federal funds rates,
nor integrate asset prices and banking risk, it correctly points towards ﬁnancial conditions and lack of
investment as the cause of the recession. The risk premium shock is simply modeled as an exogenous
premium in the return to bonds in the consumption equation, while the investment shock is modeled
as a shock to the price of investment goods relative to consumption goods.
The other shocks have largely offsetting impacts on growth during the recession. The exogenous
spending shock contributes positively to growth consistent with the observed improvement of the cur-
rent account during this period. Throughout 2009 we observe contractionary monetary policy shocks.
They arise because actual policy is constrained at the zero bound, while funds rate expectations turn
negativethroughout2009asprescribedbythepolicyrule’sresponsetooutputandinﬂationconditions.
Over the forecast period from 2011 onwards, GDP growth returns to steady state as the impact
of positive demand shocks dissipates. The main reason for the forecast staying above average growth
over the forecast period are the investment-speciﬁc technology shocks. In the medium term the price-
markup shocks reduce the output growth forecast somewhat. They reﬂect an exogenous price increase
that causes inﬂation and depresses output.
5.4 Conditioning forecasts on speciﬁc future policy decisions
Types of conditioning assumptions
Staff forecasts at policy institutions often form an important basis for discussions among decision
makers. Frequently, they also request that staff forecasts be conditioned on a particular hypothetical
path for future policy. Depending on the resulting forecasts, policy makers can then consider whether
and how to change the policy instrument they are charged to use relative to the assumed baseline.
There are a number of different underlying assumptions that may be used for generating such
policy-conditioned forecasts: (i) unchanged policy; (ii) market-based expectations; (iii) a decision by
policy makers on a preferred anticipated policy path; or (iv) an estimated or preferred policy rule.
(i) Unchanged policy. For example, the baseline budget forecast of the U.S. Congressional Budget
Ofﬁce is always based on existing laws and regulations. Similarly, many central banks use staff
forecasts that are based on a constant interest rate path. Such a simple benchmark path may be
46considered useful by members of a decision making committee for they can state their personal
opinions relative to a seemingly purely technical benchmark. It should be understood, however, that
a forecast based on unchanged ﬁscal or monetary policy is usually not the best possible forecast.
It may not even be consistent with long-run stability. For example, the forecast of a particular
budget deﬁcit under existing laws and regulations may imply that government debt is unsustainable.
Similarly, a constant central bank interest rate path may imply explosive dynamics. In fact, in rational
expectations models it is essential for the existence of a short-run equilibrium that policy rates
eventually adjust in an endogenous manner.
(ii) Market-based expectations. An alternative conditioning assumption is given by market-based
expectations of the relevant policy variable. These expectations may reﬂect market participants
perceptions of the policy rule that best describes the systematic, predictable component of policy
makers’ decision making. An assumed future policy path based on market expectations avoids the
lack of plausibility of the unchanged policy assumption. It also avoids difﬁculties and commitment
issues arising in the construction of a path that reﬂects policy makers’ expectations. However,
market expectations may not be conditioned on a sufﬁciently stabilizing policy. Including this
assumption directly in public policy maker forecasts, which then determine policy decisions, could
mean that market expectations feed back on themselves. This may be stabilizing or not, but certainly
complicates communication regarding the forecast.
(iii) Decision on preferred anticipated policy path. A more consistent approach would be to
ask policy makers ﬁrst to decide on an anticipated path for the policy variable and then use this
path to create a forecast. Whether or not such consistency is needed or even helpful for decision
making is likely to depend on the particular role of the forecast in the policy making process.
For example, if there is a debate in parliament about the likely budgetary impacts of certain ﬁscal
initiatives it would appear perfectly suitable for the staff of the budget ofﬁce to supply different
forecasts conditioned on each policy proposal that is being debated. A different matter may be
the forecast of central bank staff that plays a key role in central bank communication to the public
as practiced primarily at inﬂation targeting central banks. In this case, it may be quite important
to present the best possible forecast to the public. As such it should be conditioned on the most
likely policy path that can be constructed based on the knowledge of decision maker preferences.
It may be difﬁcult to organize such a process but it is likely to improve communication with the public.
(iv) Policy rule. Finally, another possibility would be to condition the forecast on a policy rule that
captures the policymaker’s past responses to important macroeconomic variables or a new rule that
matches policymakers’ preferences. Examples would be central bank interest rate rules such as those
estimated in section 4 of this chapter. Similarly, forecasts used for ﬁscal policy purposes could be
based on particular feedback rules for government purchases, transfers or tax rates. However, policy
makers might not be inclined to assign a particular rule such a prominent place in their deliberations.
47Furthermore, if members of a decision making committee disagree about speciﬁc policy objectives
they will also disagree on the appropriate policy rules.
Experience with different conditioning assumptions at central banks
A detailed discussion of the practices at central banks is available from Goodhart (2009). Table 8
lists conditioning assumptions used by several central banks.
Table 8: Conditioning assumptions of different central banks
constant path market based expectations policy committee based expectations
US (most of the time)
UK (1992-2004) UK (since 2004)
Sweden (until 2007) Sweden (since 2007)
euro area (until 2006Q1) euro area (since 2006Q2)
Norway (since 2006)
New Zealand
Central banks have primarily used the ﬁrst three approaches from the above list. Thus, they have
used a constant interest rate path based on the latest interest rate level; expected future short term
interest rates implied by the yield curve, and a path that explicitly corresponds to the expectations of
the monetary policy committee for future interest rates.
The choice between these three conditioning assumptions also appears to depend on whether
the conditional forecast is only used internally or whether it is used to communicate policy to the
public. While conditioning on a constant interest rate path might be a useful input in policy committee
deliberations, it is less suited to be published to be understood as a forecast of likely future conditions.
Publishing a forecast that is at odds with otherwise communicated expectations, such as long-run price
stability, may confuse observers. Furthermore, in many situations it is very different from the path that
policy makers expect for the future and may want to signal to markets. Thus, not surprisingly, most
central banks have eventually switched to other conditioning assumptions. Using market expectations
of short-term interest rates is rather popular. Gal´ ı (2008) notes, however, that it might be difﬁcult to
disentangle expected short term interest rates from liquidity and term premia.
An interest rate path that reﬂects explicitly the views of the monetary policy committee is the most
complex choice. While it allows for the most consistent discussion and decision about interest rates, it
might create some problems in practice. Perhaps, not all committee members can agree with it. It may
be easier for smaller than larger committees to vote on a sequence of interest rates into the future. It
may also be difﬁcult to communicate that the path is to be understood by the public as an expectation
and not a commitment of policy makers. However, so far central banks practicing this approach such
48as those of New Zealand or Norway have reported a positive experience.
The fourth option mentioned above, that is the assumption that central bank interest rates will
follow an estimated rule capturing past practice or a rule that is conceived to be optimal, have not
been used much in ofﬁcial forecasts. However, this assumption is nevertheless very common in policy
analysis presented to central bank decision makers.
Using such a forecast as a basis for discussions among policy makers is appealing for two reasons.
First, advantages of rule-based policy have been widely documented in economic research and using
rules within forecasts would emphasize the systematic nature of the envisioned policy. Second, a
policy rule provides a natural benchmark for discussions how to appropriately adjust the interest rate.
The debate in the policy committee could focus on whether the path implied by the rule is appropriate
or whether the rule fails to capture certain current developments and thus a deviation is in order.
A rule-based approach would also increase transparency in communicating policy decisions to
the public. Policy makers can clearly distinguish between systematic responses to inﬂation and
output and additional responses to other variables that are not included in the rule and comment on
reasons for the latter. Already, interest rate prescriptions from different policy rules are routinely com-
puted by the staff of central banks as an input for policy discussions of the decision making committee.
Techniques for computing forecasts conditional on an exogenous policy path
Goodhart (2009) points out that a forecast conditional on an assumed future path for policy is a
simulation rather than a forecast and should be interpreted as such. Such a procedure naturally assigns
a role to structural macroeconomic models in computing and interpreting forecasts conditional on the
exogenous policy path (for applications see for example Smets and Wouters (2004), Adolfson et al.
(2007a) and Maih (2010)34).
In simulating unchanged-policy scenarios, it is important to incorporate technical restrictions that
ensure the existence of unique equilibrium. Macroeconomic models typically exhibit explosiveness or
equilibrium indeterminacy when the nominal interest rate does not respond in a stabilization fashion
to inﬂation. Thus, most studies assume that the interest rate is held constant for a certain period and a
policy rule kicks in afterwards to ensure the existence of a determinate equilibrium, or the uniqueness
of such an equilibrium. Similarly, macroeconomic models that do not exhibit Ricardian equivalence
such as the CCTW model require a stabilizing tax policy to ensure convergence to a steady-state debt
to GDP ratio.
Given the above restrictions, the temporarily ﬁxed policy period may be simulated by adjusting
future policy shocks in a way to keep the policy variable on the assumed path. For example, a constant
interest rate path that precedes a return to a policy rule with an endogenous response to inﬂation,
output and the lagged interest rate, could be achieved by choosing policy shocks that exactly offset
any reactions to inﬂation, the output gap and past interest rates over the chosen period.
There are two possibilities to adjust future shocks that have very different implications for the
34The focus in some of these papers is to use conditioning assumptions to include extra information in the model that
potentially can improve the forecast.
49modeling of market participants’ expectations. One approach is to assume that the agents in the
model believe that the policy authority follows a rule. Policy shocks designed to keep the policy
instrument constant are assumed not to be known to agents in advance. They are surprise shocks and
do affect expectations only when they actually occur. Variables that are inﬂuenced by expectations
about future values of the policy instrument change only gradually since agents do not know these
shocks in advance, but only learn about them as they happen. Despite important limitations, this
method has been used extensively in central bank circles to simulate constant interest rate scenarios.
First, this method does not provide a good benchmark scenario for policy makers, because it im-
plies that effects of the constant policy assumptions via market expectations are negated. Expectations
play a crucial role in macroeconomic policy transmission, and for this reason, feature importantly in
DSGE models. These models have been build to analyze effects of policy on endogenous variables
through expectations. Thus, it would appear counterproductive to abstract from these effects.
Furthermore, adjustingstochasticpolicyshocksisonlyreasonableaslongastheseadjustedshocks
are in the range of historically observed policy shocks. Leeper and Zha (2003) call a policy interven-
tion or shock modest if it ”[...] does not signiﬁcantly shift agents beliefs about policy regime and does
not induce the changes in behavior that Lucas (1976) emphasizes.” Concerning the constant interest
rate scenarios considered at central banks, Smets and Wouters (2004) and Adolfson et al. (2007a)
ﬁnd that the surprise shocks needed in medium-sized DSGE models to keep the interest rate con-
stant cannot be characterized as modest policy interventions, because they are often much larger than
historically observed policy shocks.
The second option is to assume that agents in the model incorporate the assumed policy path in
their expectation formation regarding future policy. They know the policy shocks that are necessary
to keep the interest rate constant in advance. In a sense, the shocks used to adjust policy to the desired
path are deterministic and often referred to with this term. Agents’ consumption and investment
decisions would be based on the anticipation of the exogenous policy path. This procedure accounts
for the Lucas critique and all endogenous variables respond in a consistent manner. In forward-
looking models, certain exogenous policy scenarios such as a constant interest rate path that lasts for
a signiﬁcant period may have substantial impacts on current values of those variables that are related
to market participants expectations of future policy.35
35Note, Gal´ ı (2008) shows in the context of constant interest rate simulations, that it is also possible to implement un-
changedpolicywithoutadjustingpolicyshocks, butbychoosingspeciﬁcpolicyrules. Thesepolicyrulesleadtodeterminacy
while at the same time ensuring that the interest rate follows the desired conditional path. However, these policy rules are
very different from conventional Taylor type rules. One example is the following rule: it = i
∗
t − γi
∗
t−1 + γ(πt + σΔyt),
where i
∗
t denotes the desired interest rate path, that includes terms from the IS-curve to fully offset any movements in inﬂa-
tion and the output gap. While using such a rule does not violate the Lucas critique, it does not seem plausible that agents
would believe that the central bank pursues a completely different rule than in the past. Therefore, we will focus here on
implementations where the central bank keeps following the same policy rule as in the past, but for some period deviates
from it by adjusting policy shocks to hold the interest rate constant or on some other exogenous path.
505.5 DSGE forecasts conditioned on the 2009 announcement of U.S. ﬁscal stimulus
To illustrate the conditioning of DSGE model forecasts on a particular policy path we use the
CCTW-SW model to evaluate the impact of the U.S. ﬁscal stimulus in 2009 that was discussed earlier
in section 2.1. Speciﬁcally, we compute forecasts conditional on an exogenous path for government
purchases. The particular path corresponds to the additional purchases announced with the legislation
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009. The values are taken
from Table 3 in Cogan et al. (2010). They are given in the ﬁrst column of said table titled ”Increase in
Federal Purchases”. The additional purchases are highest in 2010 and 2011 but remain modest over
all because much of the stimulus was allotted to transfers and tax reductions.
The ﬁscal sector of the CCTW-SW model
Before proceeding to a discussion of the simulations, we review the ﬁscal sector and important
related assumptions in the CCTW-SW model. A complete list and description of the equations of the
log-linearized version of the model is contained in appendix A.
Government purchases Gt appear in the resource constraint. Cogan et al. (2010) have added
households that do not have access to ﬁnancial markets and therefore cannot smooth consumption
to the model of Smets and Wouters (2007). Such an extension was proposed by Gal´ ı et al. (2007)
in the context of a small New Keynesian model in order to understand the consequences of ﬁscal
shocks. Only a share 1 − ω of households indexed by j ∈ [0,1 − ω) makes optimizing, forward
looking decisions and these households have access to ﬁnancial markets. The remaining share ω of
households indexed by i ∈ [1 − ω,1] - the rule-of-thumb consumers - do not have access to ﬁnancial
markets and simply consume their wage income less lump-sum tax payments.
In the absence of rule-of-thumb consumers, the model exhibits Ricardian equivalence, that is, with
only permanent-income households that pay lump-sum taxes the timing of taxes and debt is irrelevant.
In this case, the only restriction is the intertemporal government budget constraint, i.e. the discounted
sum of government budget surpluses must cover the initial debt.
In the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers, the timing of taxes and debt matters. Thus, the
CCTW-SW model includes the government budget identity:
PtGT + Bt−1 = Tt +
Bt
Rt
, (22)
where Bt refers to government bonds and Tt to lump-sum taxes. Rt denotes the nominal interest
rate and Pt the nominal price level. Since the speed with which government debt is paid off matters
for model dynamics, the model is closed with a log-linear ﬁscal policy rule suggested by Gal´ ıe ta l .
(2007). This rule sets the percentage deviation of lump-sum taxes from steady-state, tt, in response to
deviations of government debt, bt, and government purchases, gt:
tt = φbbt + φggt, (23)
where φb and φg determine the elasticities of lump-sum taxes with respect to government debt and
government spending.
51These taxes are ”lump sum” in the sense that they do not affect incentives to work, save or invest.
They do, however, lower future after tax earnings and thereby wealth. Because of the absence of
taxes that distort incentives, the model is not suited for analyzing the longer-term consequences of
ﬁscal policy. However, it may well be used to analyze temporary changes in government purchases
as in Cogan et al. (2010)’s analysis of the ARRA.36
ARRA simulations by conditioning on policy shocks
We consider both methods for conditioning on a policy path by adding suitably chosen shocks that
are discussed in the preceding section. Of course, given that the ARRA legislation was announced and
known to the public, the use of deterministic shocks that treat the additional government purchases as
anticipated is much more appropriate than the stochastic shocks which treat the additional purchases
as surprises. Nevertheless, we simulate the stochastic case for comparison because it has been widely
used at central banks in the context of interest rate policy. Our example will serve to illustrate that it
is rarely appropriate.
The stochastic shock case is implemented in the DYNARE model solution software (see Juillard,
2001) and thus easily usable. The software computes the policy shocks that are necessary to keep
government purchases on the proposed future path.
Figure 10 reports the forecasts obtained with the CCTW model from section 5.3. The data goes
through 2009Q1 and the forecasts start in 2009Q2, that is right after the ARRA legislation was passed.
Coincidentally, the recession started to fade and the recovery gained ground in subsequent quarters.
The solid black line refers to the data and the solid gray line to the forecast without information on
ARRA purchases. The dashed line indicates the forecast conditioned on ARRA purchases simulated
with stochastic shocks. The dashed-dotted line reports the forecast conditioned on ARRA purchases
simulated with anticipated shocks.
Generally, the inclusion of ARRA purchases does not change the forecast very much. The top
right panel indicates that the level of GDP is a bit higher throughout the forecast if ARRA purchases
are included explicitly. Thus, it has a stimulative effect. However, both, consumption and investment
growth are lower than in the forecast without ARRA. Increased government spending crowds out pri-
vate spending. The stimulative effect is a bit larger in the simulation with stochastic shocks than in
the simulation with anticipated deterministic shocks. The reason is that households reduce consump-
tion initially more if they anticipate higher government spending to persist in the future. Given that
the ARRA was public information, the simulation with stochastic shocks overstates the likely GDP
impact of the ﬁscal stimulus.
For a thorough analysis of these methods in the context of simulating exogenous central bank
36Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) show that if one takes incentive effects through increases in distortionary taxes into
account in evaluating the impact of ARRA spending an increase in government spending would eventually reduce real GDP.
They show that such a decrease of real GDP through increases in distortionary taxes can be long lasting. Cogan et al.
(2012) go beyond an analysis of temporary changes in government purchases and taxes and analyse permanent changes in
government purchases, transfers and distortionary taxes in the context of ﬁscal consolidation proposals for the US economy.
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Figure 10: Conditioning 2009:Q2 forecasts on announced ARRA government purchases: Data (solid black line), forecast without
ARRA (solid gray line), forecast with ARRA stochastic shocks (dashed line), forecast with ARRA anticipated (dashed-dotted line)
interest rate paths the reader is referred to Gal´ ı (2008). He shows that different implementation strate-
gies of an interest rate path lead to different projected output and inﬂation dynamics. This is due to
a multiplicity of possible combinations of the real interest rate and expected inﬂation that lead to the
same nominal interest rate. Thus, it is crucial to consider which is more appropriate in the particular
situation the forecast is made and used in policy deliberations. Also, in terms of publishing forecasts it
is important to explain the procedure used. ”A complete description would need to include the nature
and speciﬁcation of the policy rule that will be followed in order to support the desired interest rate
path.” (Gal´ ı, 2008, p. 16). This might be difﬁcult in practice and is an additional argument for basing
central bank forecasts on a speciﬁc announced policy rule, rather than on a hypothetical interest rate
path.
We close this section with a discussion of the interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policies at the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates. In the debate on the desirability of ﬁscal stimulus packages it
has repeatedly been emphasized that ﬁscal stimulus has greater multiplier effects in the event when
nominal interest rates are constrained at the zero interest rate ﬂoor. In this situation, ﬁscal stimulus
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Figure 11: GDP, consumption and investment forecasts: Anticipated government purchases and explicit zero bound on nominal interest
rates.
does not induce an immediate increase in interest rates because the notional interest rate target of the
central bank is in negative territory.
Indeed, the ﬁrst panel in the second row of Figure 10 shows negative nominal interest rates in
2009. To investigate the impact of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates we introduce this
non-negativity constraint explicitly in the model structure.37 Such a formulation is necessary to be
able to determine the number of quarters for which the nominal interest would stay at the zero bound
endogenously. As a consequence of the non-negativity constraint, the model needs to be solved by
means of nonlinear methods. We make use of the stacked-Fair-Taylor algorithm implemented in
DYNARE (see Juillard, 1996).
Figure 11 reports the GDP impact (solid line) of the ARRA government purchases when the zero
bound is implemented explicitly. The information shown in the ﬁgure is the difference between the
simulations with and without ARRA purchases using anticipated shocks. The model forecast implies
that the nominal interest rate (not shown) stays at zero for three quarters. The bars indicate quar-
terly ARRA purchases as a share of GDP. The GDP impact is lower than the government purchases
throughout the simulation. In other words, the multiplier is below one. Private consumption and
investment are reduced relative to the simulation without ﬁscal stimulus. The GDP impact of ﬁscal
stimulus is only slightly greater than in the simulation without the zero bound.
Note, the data shown in Figure 10 indicates that the nominal interest rate stayed at zero longer
than implied by the forecast with the explicit zero bound. However, this ﬁnding is consistent with
output staying below the level predicted by the same forecasts, and thus monetary policy continuing
to remain accommodative.
37See Orphanides, Coenen and Wieland (2004) for the functional form.
545.6 Forecast comparison and forecast accuracy
Whether forecasts are useful for policy design depends on their accuracy. Thus, we compare the
quality of inﬂation and output growth forecasts from the Fed’s Greenbook and from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) with forecasts from the different types of macroeconomic models con-
sidered in the previous sections.
The SPF is a quarterly survey of professional macroeconomic forecasters conducted by the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Typically, 30 to 50 respondents report projections of several key
macroeconomic variables. The mean of the SPF forecasts is often more accurate than individual fore-
casts and can serve as an important source of information for policy makers regarding private sector
expectations.
We ﬁrst check whether forecasts are unbiased, then we will check how model-based forecasts
compare in terms of accuracy to forecasts from professional forecasters and policy institutions. With
regard to the latter, we focus on predictions around turning points because downturns and recoveries
pose the greatest challenge for economic forecasters.
Forecast bias
A good forecast should not be systematically higher or lower than the actual values of the fore-
casted variable if the forecast is based on a symmetric loss function. Otherwise there would be sys-
tematic forecast errors and the forecast would be biased. An exception is the case of an asymmetric
loss function as we discussed in section 2. but even if forecasts for ﬁscal or monetary policy purposes
are based on asymmetric loss functions, it is still of interest to check whether forecasts are biased and
to assess whether such a bias can be rationalized by assuming a speciﬁc asymmetric loss function.
Figure 12 plots a measure of the forecast bias for the Greenbook forecasts (solid line) and the
mean forecast of the Survey of Professional forecasters (SPF, dotted line) and indicates how the bias
varies over time.
The sample of Greenbook forecasts ends in 2005 as Greenbook data remains conﬁdential for ﬁve
years. We measure the forecast bias as the average of the forecast error: 1/T
 T
t=1 Et(yt+h) − yt+h,
where T denotes the number of forecasts that is taken into account, Et(yt+h) refers to the forecast
for horizon h and yt+h denotes the data realizations. We focus on quarterly annualized output growth
and quarterly annualized inﬂation forecasts. The deﬁnition of data realizations is not a trivial choice
as output growth data is revised substantially over time. GDP data is ﬁrst released about one month
after the end of the quarter to which the data refers, the so-called advance release. These data are
then revised several times at the occasion of the preliminary release, ﬁnal release, annual revisions
and benchmark revisions. We follow Faust and Wright (2009) and use the data point in the vintage
that was released two quarters after the quarter to which the data refer to as revised data. For example,
revised data for 2001:Q1 is obtained by selecting the entry for 2001:Q1 from the data vintage released
in 2001:Q3. To study how the bias has changed over time we plot the average forecast error over a
moving window of 40 quarterly observations, i.e. of 10 years.
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Figure 12: The graphs shows time variations in forecast bias. Bias is measured as the average forecast error of Greenbook (GB) and
SPF forecasts over a moving window of 40 observations each. We use the data point in the vintage that was released two quarters after
the quarter to which the data refer to as revised data. Inﬂation is deﬁned as annualized quarterly inﬂation and output growth is deﬁned as
annualized quarterly output growth.
The panels in Figure 12 show that Greenbook and SPF inﬂation forecasts exhibited an upward
bias from about 1975 to 2000. Forecasters overestimated inﬂation by up to 1 percent. The bias is
somewhat smaller for the Greenbook than for the SPF. The bias increases with the forecast horizon.
The bias decreased in the 1990s and has disappeared for recent observations. Inﬂation bias would
be consistent with asymmetric loss. The time-varying nature of this bias, however, may be more
difﬁcult to rationalize. Moreover the bias is similar for the Greenbook and the SPF forecasts. While
the former is a forecast from a policy institution which might weigh positive and negative forecast
errors differently, it is more difﬁcult to see why private sector forecasters would also weigh them
asymmetrically. Another reason for this bias could be the great moderation. Inﬂation rates have
decreased since the early 1980s. If forecasters use econometric models estimated on past data, it is
likely that they included the high trend inﬂation from past data and thus overestimated future inﬂation.
56Output growth forecasts are negatively biased for the 1990s. Output growth was very high espe-
cially in the late 1990s due to high productivity growth. This result is consistent with Patton and Tim-
mermann (2007). They ﬁnd that Greenbook forecast are suboptimal under a symmetric loss function.
However, the forecasts are optimal if overpredicting output growth is more costly than underpredict-
ing. They ﬁnd that this asymmetry also depends on the level of output growth and is more important
during periods of low growth. In such periods they ﬁnd that overpredictions of GDP growth are more
than three times as costly to the Fed as underpredictions, whereas in times of high growth overpredic-
tions are only about 25% more costly than underpredictions. A reason for such a loss function might
be that overpredicting output growth after a recession might incorrectly signal a strong recovery and
could result in an overly tight monetary policy increasing the danger of falling back into a recession.
An alternative explanation is that a long period of unusually high output growth led to an under-
prediction of growth rates with econometric models based on past data. At the end of the sample the
bias is positive, especially for high forecast horizons, which might be inﬂuenced by data from the
recent ﬁnancial crisis. As we will show in more detail below, professional forecasters were not able
to predict the deep recession of 2008/2009 and thus over-predicted growth rates.
A good forecast should not exhibit systematic errors unless the forecast is based on an asymmetric
loss function. Theil notes: ”If there are any errors in the forecasting process on which the measures
taken are based, the measures themselves will in general be suboptimal. Hence a preliminary analysis
of forecasts and especially of forecasting errors must be considered useful. Of course, forecasting in
the ﬁeld of economics is a hazardous enterprise, so that errors as such need not amaze us; but if it
were possible to detect forecasting errors which we might call ”systematic,” this could be helpful to
ﬁnd systematic failures in the adaptation of instruments, and it might be possible to indicate ways in
which such failures can be avoided, at least approximately” (Theil, 1958, p. 3).
To test whether the bias we found is signiﬁcant and whether the forecasts are optimal in the sense
that forecast errors are unpredictable, we use Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions (Mincer and Zarnowitz,
1969). We regress data realizations on a constant and the forecasts:
yt+h = α + βEt(yt+h). (24)
If the forecast error is unpredictable and thus the forecast unbiased, then α =0and β =1 .I f
the intercept is different from zero, then the forecast has been systematically higher or lower than
the actual data. If the slope is different from one then the forecast has systematically over- or under-
predicted deviations from the mean (see e.g. Edge and G¨ urkaynak, 2010).
We run the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression and estimate Newey-West standard errors with the num-
ber of lags equal to the forecast horizon to take into account serial correlation of overlapping forecasts.
We conduct F-tests of the joint null hypothesis α =0and β =1 . We run these tests for the moving
window of 40 quarterly forecasts to check whether forecasting accuracy has changed over time.
Figure 13 plots the p-values of the test for forecast optimality for the Greenbook (solid line) and
SPF (dotted line) forecasts. A p-value smaller than 0.05 indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of
optimal forecasts on the 5% level, which implies a signiﬁcant bias. The p-values reﬂect the magnitude
57of the estimated bias shown previously. Greenbook and SPF inﬂation forecasts are signiﬁcantly
biased from about 1980 to 2000, the time with the highest estimated inﬂation bias. The length of
the bias period increases with the forecast horizon. More recently, the bias has disappeared from the
SPF forecasts. Unfortunately, the Greenbook forecasts are not yet available for recent years to check
whether they have also turned unbiased. Output growth forecasts are unbiased for large parts of the
sample. Only the systematic under-prediction of output growth in the 1990s is statistically signiﬁcant.
Information content of forecasts
While the previous statistics show whether a forecast can be be improved by eliminating a sys-
tematic bias, they do not indicate whether forecasts contain much information about actual future
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Figure 13: The graphs shows time variations in the efﬁciency of Greenbook (GB) and SPF forecasts measured by the p-value of a F-test
of the joint null-hypothesis of optimal forecasts α =0and β =1in the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression yt+h = α + βEtyt+h. A p-value
smaller than 0.05 rejects the null hypothesis of optimal forecasts on the 5% level. A p-value larger than 0.05 shows that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of optimal forecasts. The straight horizontal line indicates a p-value of 0.05.
58economic developments, and therefore constitute valuable information for policy makers. One way
to assess the information content of forecasts is to check how much of the variability of the data is
explained by the forecasts. We use the R2 from the Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions to evaluate the
informational content of forecasts. The R2 can be directly interpreted as the fraction of the variance
in the data that is explained by the forecasts. This fraction will be always below 1 as there are shocks
and idiosyncrasies that no economic model can capture. Figure 14 shows the R2 from the rolling
window regressions.
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Figure 14: The graphs shows the R2 in the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression yt+h = α + βEtyt+h for Greenbook (GB) and SPF
forecasts. A high value shows that a large fraction of the variance in the data is captured by the forecasts. A low value shows that forecasts
can explain little of the variation of the forecasted variable.
The results are similar for the Greenbook and SPF forecasts. They show that the R2 decreases
withtheforecasthorizon. Thisﬁndingindicatesthatitismoredifﬁculttopredictdevelopmentsfurther
ahead. Interestingly, the R2 for the nowcasts is substantially below unity over the whole sample. The
R2 varies a lot over time taking values roughly between 0.1 and 0.6 for inﬂation. However, for the
59last 20 years the informational content of the inﬂation forecasts has dropped to values close to zero.
A reason may be that the volatility of inﬂation has fallen to rather low level since the early 1990s.
Inﬂation can now be characterized as idiosyncratic deviations from a low constant rate. Stock and
Watson (2007) show that the predictable, that is permanent component of inﬂation has been fairly
high in the 1980s but has almost disappeared in the 1990s. The remaining ﬂuctuations of inﬂation
are not persistent and thus hardly predictable. Monetary policy may have been a key factor causing
inﬂation to be difﬁcult to forecast. Given a sufﬁciently high inﬂation response monetary policy might
eliminate any lasting deviations from trend inﬂation or the inﬂation target (see e.g. Benati, 2008;
Gerlach and Tillmann, 2010, for some empirical evidence from inﬂation targeting central banks).
With regard to output growth, nowcasts explain a larger fraction of the variability of data
realizations than in the case of inﬂation. However, the predictability of output growth quickly
decreases with the forecast horizon and is close to zero for forecast horizons 2-4. Even the nowcast
can only explain on average 50% of the variance of output growth data. This is not too surprising
given the fact that output growth estimates are heavily revised even after the ﬁrst data releases.38
There is one period in the sample for which the informational content of output growth forecasts is
especially low: the 1990s. For this period we also found a large forecast bias. Given the difﬁculties
in forecasting output accurately beyond the nowcast, it is not surprising that policy institutions, and
central banks in particular, put a lot of effort in estimating at least the current state of the economy
relatively precisely.
Predicting turning points
In the following, we focus more closely on turning points in the business cycle. Forecasting
performance during those periods is particularly important to policy makers. In doing so we will also
compare the performance of model-based forecasts to Greenbook and SPF forecasts.
Wieland and Wolters (2011) investigate the accuracy of forecasts from the SPF, the Greenbook
and six macroeconomic models during the ﬁve most recent U.S. recessions. The six macroeconomic
modelsconsideredintheirpaperarethreesmall-scaleNew-Keynesianmodels, aBayesianVARmodel
and two medium-scale DSGE models. The models are estimated on real-time data vintages that were
also available to professional forecasters at the time when forecasts were computed.39
Figure 15 shows output growth forecasts from the SPF, the Greenbook, and the six macroeco-
nomic models for the 2008/2009 U.S. recessions. The black line shows real-time data until the fore-
cast starting point and revised data afterwards. The grey lines correspond to individual forecasts from
the SPF. The green line indicates the mean SPF forecast. The red lines are the model-based forecasts.
Professional forecasters, on average failed to foresee the recession caused by the ﬁnancial crisis, even
38It would be interesting to compute the R
2 of the advance release of GDP in a Mincer-Zarnowitz regression. Even this
ﬁrst ofﬁcial estimate of GDP probably explains much less than 100% in the variability of revised GDP data.
39The macroeconomic models are estimated on quarterly data and thus have a disadvantage for computing a nowcast
as they cannot use within quarter information from higher frequency data. We eliminate this informational advantage by
conditioning the model forecasts on the Greenbook nowcasts and for the most recent recession on the mean SPF nowcast.
602008 2009 2010
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Forecast start: 2008Q3
2008 2009 2010
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Forecast start: 2008Q4
2008 2009 2010
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Forecast start: 2009Q1
2008 2009 2010
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Forecast start: 2009Q2
Figure 15: The graph shows output growth forecasts from the SPF, the Greenbook, and six macroeconomic models for the most recent
U.S. recessions. The black line shows real-time data until the forecast starting point and revised data afterwards. The grey lines show
individual forecasts from the SPF. The green line shows the mean of the SPF forecasts. The red lines show the model-based forecasts.
as late as in the third quarter of 2008. The mean SPF forecast indicates a slowdown in the fourth
quarter followed by a return to higher growth in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. The model-based forecasts
would not have performed any better. In fact, they do not indicate any impending decline in eco-
nomic activity. In the fourth quarter of 2008, following the Lehman debacle, professional forecasters
drastically revised their assessments downwards, and continued to do so in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009.
From 2009Q2 onwards, the model-based forecasts perform quite well in predicting the recovery of
the U.S. economy. From that point onwards, several of the models deliver predictions that are very
similar to the mean SPF forecast and match up with the subsequent data releases well. Studying all
the individual forecasts from the SPF, it is clear that not a single forecaster delivered a point forecast
of the deep recession.
Figure 16 shows a similar ﬁgure for the 2001 recession. It conﬁrms that model-based as well as
SPF-forecasts have difﬁculties predicting accurately beyond the nowcast. For this recession Green-
book projections are also available. The Greenbook projections (purple line) do not predict the reces-
sion any more accurately. In 2001Q1 and 2001Q2 the nowcast of most forecasters shows a decline in
growth which is relatively accurate. However, most forecasters predicted an increase in growth from
horizon 1 onwards. Revised data shows that growth moved in the opposite direction towards negative
growth rates. In 2001Q3 model-based forecasts, SPF forecasts and Greenbook projections predicted
a recovery. The actual recovery started one quarter later. In 2001Q4 the recovery took place, but all
forecasters missed it and predicted a much lower nowcast. This example reinforces that it is very
difﬁcult to predict recessions and business cycle turning points.
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Figure 16: The graph shows output growth forecasts from the SPF, the Greenbook, and six macroeconomic models for the most recent
U.S. recessions. The black line shows real-time data until the forecast starting point and revised data afterwards. The grey lines show
individual forecasts from the SPF. The green line shows the mean of the SPF forecasts. The purple line shows the Greenbook projection
and the red lines show the model-based forecasts.
Forecasts during the recession in the early 1990s (not shown) indicate that forecasters also failed
to predict this recession. However, once the downturn took place in 1990Q4 SPF forecasters and
Greenbook projections predict the recovery relatively well. The model-based forecasts show an up-
ward bias similar to what we observed for the 2008Q4 predictions. The recovery in 1991Q1 and
1991Q2 is predicted relatively precisely by the SPF forecasters and some of the model forecasts. Two
of the models as well as the Federal Reserve predicted higher growth rates.
While model forecasts exhibited an upward bias compared to the professional forecasts for
the 2008/2009 and the early 1990s recession, the mean SPF forecast is within the range of the
model-based forecasts for the 2001 recession. Thus, stylized macroeconomic models perform not
much worse than professional forecasters even though the number of data series used by models
is only a small fraction of the data universe that experts can look at and judge to be important.
Thus, once models are add-factored with such judgements they may do just as well or possibly
even better than the expert forecasts. Similar graphs can be produced for inﬂation forecasts (not
shownhere). Theytendtoconﬁrmthatmodel-basedforecastsareroughlyinlinewithexpertforecasts.
Comparing the accuracy of model-based and expert forecasts
The results above show that economic forecasting is an extremely difﬁcult endeavor. There are
clearly limitations to the accuracy of forecasts especially around turning points that policy makers
should be aware off. The policy process often relies on forecasts that are conditional on exogenous
policy assumptions. As discussed in section 5.4 structural models are well suited for such exercises.
62Table 9: RMSEs of Forecasts Initialized with Expert Nowcasts
Inﬂation Output Growth
Sample / Horizon Mean GB SPF Mean GB SPF
1980:1 - 1981:3
0 1.67 1.67 1.52 5.05 5.05 −
1 2.59 1.25 1.81 5.83 6.65 −
2 2.59 1.66 1.92 4.83 5.54 −
3 1.73 1.77 2.23 5.20 6.11 −
4 3.22 2.21 2.56 4.05 5.32 −
1981:4 - 1983:4
0 1.12 1.12 1.13 2.42 2.42 2.14
1 1.86 1.32 1.76 3.54 3.58 3.88
2 1.92 1.26 1.68 3.86 3.93 4.11
3 1.79 1.07 1.95 4.25 3.91 4.41
4 1.87 1.48 2.06 4.28 3.84 4.02
1990:1 - 1992:1
0 0.73 0.73 1.09 1.27 1.27 1.12
1 1.03 0.84 0.98 2.47 2.09 1.45
2 1.23 0.95 1.01 2.82 2.34 2.06
3 1.20 1.06 1.19 2.94 2.31 2.54
4 1.16 1.02 1.19 2.69 2.18 2.37
2000:4 - 2002:4
0 0.56 0.56 0.70 2.28 2.28 2.22
1 0.85 0.87 0.87 2.23 2.20 2.30
2 1.23 0.70 0.92 2.11 2.34 2.21
3 1.25 0.75 0.93 2.65 2.76 2.65
4 1.45 0.78 0.98 2.19 2.18 2.13
2007:4 - 2009:3
0 1.11 − 1.11 1.94 − 1.94
1 1.10 − 1.03 4.21 − 3.30
2 1.28 − 1.10 4.89 − 4.11
3 1.51 − 1.24 5.32 − 4.80
4 1.65 − 1.40 5.70 − 5.39
Given the limitations of forecasting the performance of structural models relative to expect forecasts
such as the SPF and the Greenbook is of interest. Thus, we now investigate the relative performance
more systematically. To this end, we compute the root mean squared prediction errors (RMSE) for all
forecasts.
Table 9 reports the RMSE of the mean forecast of the six models, the Greenbook and the mean
forecast of the SPF for inﬂation and output growth for the ﬁve most recent NBER deﬁned US reces-
sions. The typical sample covers the period from 4 quarters prior to the trough determined by the
NBER to 4 quarters after the trough.
In most cases model forecasts for inﬂation are on average somewhat less accurate than the Green-
book and mean SPF forecasts. The Greenbook forecasts are in turn more accurate than the mean SPF
forecast. Regardingoutput growthforecasts from models and professional forecasters are verysimilar.
Only for the 2008/2009 recession the SPF forecasts are more accurate than the model forecasts. For
all other recessions there is not much of a difference between model forecasts, Greenbook projections
63and SPF forecasts. Wieland and Wolters (2011) report that individual models perform worse than
their mean forecast. This is also true for the SPF (see e.g. Timmermann, 2006, on forecast averaging).
Using a variety of different forecasting tools as currently practiced by many policy institutions is thus
important to increase the accuracy of a ﬁnal overall forecast.
6 Evaluating the performance of policy rules that respond to forecasts
Given the lack of accuracy of available model and expert forecasts and the heterogeneity resulting
from reasonable differences in modeling assumptions, it is important to investigate whether policy
maker decisions should explicitly and directly respond to changes in forecasts rather than recent data
realizations. This question is of importance for many areas of policy making including monetary and
ﬁscal policy. Answering this question requires simulating feedback rules in structural models that
account for the interaction of economic forecasts with policy decisions. The type of models presented
in the preceding section can be used for analyzing forecast-based feedback rules for monetary and
ﬁscal policy instruments. Of course, space limitations in this chapter require us to select a particular
example rather than covering a wide range of different policy instruments. Since we have provided
new empirical evidence regarding direct responses of policy decisions to policy maker forecasts in
the case of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in section 4, we now also evaluate the
performance of such rules for the federal funds rate in models of the U.S. economy.
Several authors (see e.g. de Brouwer and Ellis, 1998; Laxton et al., 1993; Black et al., 1997) have
analyzed the performance of forecast-based monetary policy rules in speciﬁc models. Using multiple
models in parallel makes it possible to investigate the importance of different structural modeling
assumptions for policy design.
To this end, we simulate rules with different horizons for inﬂation and output forecasts in three
models: the small IMF quarterly projection model of the U.S. by Carabenciov et al. (2008); the
medium-size DSGE model by Cogan et al. (2010) (CCTW-SW), and the linearized version of the
FRB/US model used by Levin et al. (2003); (see also Brayton and Tinsley, 1996; Reifschneider et al.,
1999). The version of the IMF-model we use is the one estimated in section 5.2 with U.S. data from
1994Q1 to 2007Q4. The version of the CCTW-SW model is the one estimated in section 5.2 with
data from 1965Q3 to 2007Q4. For the FRB/US model we use the same parameter values as in Levin
et al. (2003). These parameters have been estimated at the Federal Reserve.
We compare the performance of policy rules across models and search for optimized rules given
a loss-function of the policy maker. In this manner, we investigate whether the conventional wisdom
that monetary policy should be forward-looking because of the existence of transmission lags is borne
out by modern macroeconomic models. The exercise is similar in spirit to Levin et al. (2003) who
optimize simple forecast-based policy rules for ﬁve different models of the U.S. economy.
646.1 Optimizing forecast-based rules for central bank interest rates
Westartbydeterminingtheoptimalresponsecoefﬁcientsandhorizonsconcerninginﬂationandoutput
gap forecasts in the following type of interest rate rule:
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)[i∗ + β(Etπt+hπ − π∗)+γEtyt+hy], (25)
Here it denotes the nominal interest rate, πt the average annual inﬂation rate, yt the output gap, π∗
the inﬂation target and i∗ the desired nominal interest rate when inﬂation and output equal their
respective targets. The nominal interest rate is measured at annual rates in percentage points. The
parameters hπ and hy denote forecast horizons measured in quarters.
Forecast horizons and equilibrium determinacy
In searching for policies that deliver good stabilization performance we will focus on rules that
yield determinacy, i.e. a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium. Rules that lead to inde-
terminacyarenotdesirablebecausetheymayinduceﬂuctuationsunrelatedtoeconomicfundamentals.
The models are too complex to identify determinacy conditions analytically. Thus, we use numerical
methods to check whether the models exhibit determinacy for speciﬁc policy parameter combinations.
Figure 17 shows determinacy regions for different combinations of the interest rate smoothing and in-
ﬂation response coefﬁcients under a range of forecast horizons. The output gap coefﬁcient is restricted
to zero, (γ =0 ). The shaded areas depict the determinacy regions.
In the absence of interest-rate smoothing, (ρ =0 ), the interest rate response to inﬂation must
simply be greater than one to ensure equilibrium determinacy. This condition, which implies that
central banks act sufﬁciently to increase the real interest rate in response to an increase in inﬂation, is
well-known and often referred to as the Taylor principle. For interest rate rules that respond to recent
outcomesofinﬂation(hπ =0 )thedeterminacyregionsareverylarge. Thedeterminacyregionsshrink
with rising forecast horizons (hπ > 0). Only the IMF-model is relatively immune to indeterminacy
problems due to its high degree of intrinsic inﬂation persistence. Some studies have suggested that
interest rate smoothing coefﬁcients larger than one can yield a unique determinate equilibrium. This
is not the case in the models analyzed here. An interest rate coefﬁcient equal to or larger than one
leads to explosive dynamics in all three models unless the inﬂation response is lower than one.
Figure 18 plots determinacy regions for rules with a unit reaction to the current output gap (γ =1 ,
hy =0 ). Allowing for an additional response to the current output gap increases the determinacy
regions especially for moderate horizons of the inﬂation forecast of up to four quarters. The output
gap is an indicator of future inﬂation and can increase the link between current and expected future
inﬂation. This ﬁnding holds also for an increase in the interest rate smoothing coefﬁcient. Both lead
to a more stabilizing policy and thus larger determinacy regions.
So far, our analysis has uncovered several conditions that render policy rules stabilizing:
responding to current inﬂation or a near-term inﬂation forecast, an additional response to the output
gap, and a substantial degree of interest rate smoothing.
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FRB/US model (linearized 2003 version)
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Figure 17: The graphs show determinacy regions for different combinations of the inﬂation response coefﬁcient β and the interest rate
smoothing coefﬁcient ρ. The response to the output gap is zero (γ =0 ). For each speciﬁcation of the inﬂation forecast horizon (0, 4, 8, 12,
16 and 20 quarters), multiple equilibira occur for all combinations of the parameters α and ρ that lie outside of the shaded area.
Optimizing forecast-based rules
Having analyzed general conditions that lead to a unique stable equilibrium we now investigate
rules with response coefﬁcients optimized to a particular model. In optimizing coefﬁcients we have
in mind a policy maker who cares about stabilizing inﬂation and the output gap. Thus, we consider
policymaker preferences that can be represented by a simple loss function of the following form:
L = var(π)+λvar(y), (26)
where var(.) denotes the unconditional variance and the weight λ ≥ 0 indicates the policymaker’s
preference for reducing output variability relative to inﬂation variability. The loss function is a one-
period version of the loss function in equation (1).
One might ask why not use a welfare function that is based on household utility (see e.g. Schmitt-
Groh´ e and Uribe, 2007). We use a traditional ad hoc loss function (this approach goes back to the
workbyTinbergen,1952;Theil,1958), becauseonlyoneofthethreemodelsconsideredhere(CCTW-
SW) would allow the derivation of a loss function from household utility. While the equations in the
66CCTW-SW model (re-estimated)
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FRB/US model (linearized 2003 version)
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Figure 18: The graphs show determinacy regions for different combinations of the inﬂation response coefﬁcient β and the interest rate
smoothing coefﬁcient ρ. The response to the output gap is one (γ =1 ). For each speciﬁcation of the inﬂation forecast horizon (0, 4, 8, 12,
16 and 20 quarters), multiple equilibira occur for all combinations of the parameters α and ρ that lie outside of the shaded area.
IMF-model and the FRB/US model are based on economic theory, they are not rigorously derived
from microeconomic optimization problems and thus the concept of a utility function is used only
implicitly.40
We use numerical methods to compute optimal policy response coefﬁcients and forecast horizons
that minimize the weighted average of inﬂation and output gap variability, subject to an upper bound
on interest rate variability. Only rules that yield determinacy are considered in the optimization.
We consider forecast horizons up to 20 quarters and restrict the policy parameters ρ, β and γ to
the interval [0,3]. The latter restriction is sometimes needed to avoid unreasonably high values for
the inﬂation response coefﬁcient (we found values above 100) that do not reduce the value of the
loss function signiﬁcantly more than an inﬂation response coefﬁcient around three. Furthermore, we
40Furthermore, a utility based welfare-function can be extremely model speciﬁc. Paez-Farrell (2010) shows that different
theories of inﬂation persistence can result in a observationally equivalent Phillips curve, but imply different loss functions
and lead to different policy prescriptions. Therefore, optimal simple rules based on structural loss functions are not robust
to model uncertainty.
67restrict the analysis to rules that imply a volatility of the ﬁrst difference of the interest rate that is no
greater than the value observed for the U.S. between 1983 and 2007.
Table 10 provides an overview of the characteristics and performance of optimized rules. For a
range of values of λ, the weight on output gap variability in the loss function, the table reports the
optimalhorizonsofinﬂationandoutputgapforecasts, hπ andhy, andtheoptimalresponsecoefﬁcients
on the lagged interest rate, inﬂation and the output gap, ρ, β and γ. The last column denoted by %ΔL
indicates the percentage reduction in the value of the loss function under the optimal forecast-based
rule relative to an optimized outcome-based rule. The value is always non-positive because the class
of outcome-based rules (hπ =0and hy =0 ) is nested within the class of forecast-based rules. In the
cases where the optimal forecast horizon is zero the value of %ΔL is zero.
Table 10: Characteristics and Performance of Optimized Rules
Model λh π hy ρβγ%ΔL
0 0 20 0.87 3.00 0.00 -2.36
CCTW-SW 1/3 0 0 1.00 3.00 0.10 0.00
(reestimated) 1 1 0 1.00 3.00 0.23 -0.06
3 3 0 0.99 3.00 0.59 -0.33
0 0 2 0.79 3.00 0.31 -13.71
IMF Model 1/3 1 3 0.82 2.60 3.00 -11.10
(reestimated) 1 1 4 0.77 3.00 2.99 -30.77
3 4 4 0.68 2.88 3.00 -30.92
0 0 0 0.94 3.00 0.42 0.00
FRB/US 1/3 18 0 0.97 3.00 2.16 -3.78
(linearized, 2003) 1 18 0 0.97 3.00 2.97 -14.04
3 16 0 0.98 3.00 3.00 -11.67
Notes: For each model and each value of the preference parameter λ, the table indicates the optimal forecast horizons
for inﬂation and the output gap (hπ and hy, respectively) and the optimal values of the policy coefﬁcients ρ, β and γ.
The table also indicate the percent change in the loss function (%ΔL) of the optimized rule compared to an optimal
outcome-based rule. The interest rate rule is given by: it = ρit−1 +(1−ρ)[i
∗ +β(Etπt+hπ −π
∗)+γEtyt+hy]. The
parameters ρ, β and γ are restricted to lie in the interval [0,3].
The optimal forecast horizons are mostly below four quarters. One exception is the horizon of
the output gap forecast in the CCTW-SW model when the policy maker places no weight on output
stabilization (λ =0 ). Other exceptions arise in the FRB/US model, where the inﬂation forecast
horizon can be rather high at 4 to 5 years. Even so, the reported loss function values indicate that
responding to forecasts rather than outcomes does not yield major improvements in the stabilization
of inﬂation and the output gap. This ﬁnding conﬁrms Levin et al. (2003). The only model where
basing policy on forecasts yields sizeable improvements is the IMF’s model. The reason is probably
the very high degree of inﬂation and output persistence in this model. In sum, forecast-based rules
offer little advantage over outcome-based rules in the majority of the models.41
41This result is also consistent with Levin et al. (1999) who ﬁnd that complicated outcome-based rules, which include a
68The optimal inﬂation response coefﬁcient is often near or at the upper corner of the interval con-
sidered in the optimization, that is a value of 3.0. The response to the output gap increases with an
increasing weight on output stabilization. It remains relatively low in the CCTW-SW model. In the
IMF and FRB/US models a positive response coefﬁcient on the output is optimal even if the policy
maker places no weight on the stabilization of the output gap (λ =0 ), probably because it is an
indicator of future inﬂation. The optimal interest rate smoothing coefﬁcient is close to unity.
Our ﬁndings do not support the conventional wisdom that central bank interest rates need to be set
in response to forecasts rather than recent outcomes, because these rates inﬂuence output and inﬂation,
i.e. the ultimate target variables, with a lag.42 It would be useful to extend our analysis by including
alternative assumptions regarding the expectations formation of market participants relative to rational
expectations. Models with least-squares learning are available, for example, from Slobodyan and
Wouters (2009a,b)).
6.2 Robustness under model uncertainty
The heterogeneity of model-based forecasts documented in the preceding section underscores the
great extent of model uncertainty faced by monetary and ﬁscal policy makers. Thus, even if certain
rules perform very well in a given model, the question remains whether they are robust to such model
uncertainty. We evaluate the robustness of the type of interest rate rules derived in the preceding sub-
section by checking how they perform in competing models. In other words, we simulate a situation
where the central bank can only use a simpliﬁed model that is an imperfect representation of the ”true”
world. Thepolicymakersearchesforanoptimalruleinthismisspeciﬁedmodel. Theevaluationmodel
represents the ”true model of the economy”, while the model used for the optimization of the policy
parameters represents the ”misspeciﬁed” model.
We conduct this exercise for outcome-based and forecast-based rules to ﬁnd out which type of
rules is more robust to model uncertainty. The exercise is similar to Levin et al. (2003) and Taylor and
Wieland (2011). They evaluate the robustness of model-speciﬁc rules, respectively, across ﬁve and
four models. Levin et al. (2003) ﬁnd that rules that respond to a short horizon inﬂation forecast of up
to one-year ahead and the current output gap and include a high degree of interest rate smoothing are
relatively robust to model uncertainty. Rules with longer forecast horizons are less robust in the sense
that they lead to indeterminacy in a number of cases. Taylor and Wieland (2011) show that rules that
are derived by averaging over the losses incurred in different models are generally more robust than
model-speciﬁc rules.
First, we consider the robustness of outcome-based rules. Table 11 reports their performance
across the three models. The ﬁrst column contains the weight on output variability in the loss function
large number of state variables and are thus similar to information encompassing forecast-based rules, yield only moderate
stabilization gains over simple rules.
42Of course, this ﬁnding does not necessarily preclude the use of forecasts in communications to the public as practiced
at many inﬂation targeting central banks even when central bank’s decisions are driven by recent outcomes rather than
forecasts of key macroeconomic variables.
69Table 11: Robustness of outcome-based model-speciﬁc rules
λ Model used to
optimize the
rule
ρβγL o s s %ΔL
evaluated in the CCTW-SW model
0 IMF 0.79 2.23 1.73 46.79 6346.9
0 FRB 0.96 3.00 0.76 5.53 661.85
1/3 IMF 0.86 3.00 2.63 50.17 274.35
1/3 FRB 0.98 2.99 2.99 46.09 243.91
1 IMF 0.83 2.09 2.82 130.57 283.44
1 FRB 0.97 3.00 1.99 46.90 37.73
evaluated in IMF model
0 CCTW-SW 0.87 3.00 0.00 1.18 18.97
0 FRB 0.96 3.00 0.76 1.61 59.28
1/3 CCTW-SW 0.99 3.00 0.22 3.11 161.34
1/3 FRB 0.98 2.99 2.99 2.14 179.83
1 CCTW-SW 0.99 3.00 0.53 4.03 137.06
1 FRB 0.97 3.00 1.99 2.80 64.71
evaluated in FRB/US model
0 CCTW-SW 0.87 3.00 0.00 5.62 80.13*
0 IMF 0.79 2.23 1.73 24.02 669.87*
1/3 CCTW-SW 0.99 3.00 0.22 91.82 239.69
1/3 IMF 0.86 3.00 2.63 26.39 -2.36*
1 CCTW-SW 0.99 3.00 0.53 216.89 217.08
1 IMF 0.83 2.09 2.82 62.97 -7.93*
*this rule violates the volatility restriction of the interest rate in the model that is used to evaluate the performance of the rule.
Notes: For each model and each value of the preference parameter λ, the table indicates the optimal policy parameters for inﬂation
and output gap outcomes (hπ =0and hy =0 ). The table also indicates the loss and the percent change in the loss function
(%ΔL) of a rule that has been optimized in another model compared to the rule that has been optimized in the same model that is
used for the evaluation. A value of ∞ shows that this speciﬁc rule does not yield determinacy. The interest rate rule is given by:
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)[i∗ + β(Etπt+hπ − π∗)+γEtyt+hy]. The parameters ρ, β and γ are restricted to lie in the interval [0,3].
We only consider rules that lead to a volatility of the ﬁrst difference of the interest rate that is equal or lower to what can be empirically
observed for the period 1983-2010.
and the second column the name of the optimization model. The next three columns show the policy
parameters of the rule to be evaluated. The last two columns indicate the loss and the percentage
change in the loss function compared to a rule that has been optimized in the model that is used for
the evaluation.
Most optimized rules exhibit a high degree of interest rate smoothing and an inﬂation coefﬁcient
close to the upper bound of 3. The rules differ a lot with respect to the parameter on the output gap.
It is rather small in the CCTW-SW model. In the FRB/US model it rises to a value near 3.0 only
when output and inﬂation variability receive equal weight in the loss function. In the IMF model,
however, it mostly takes on values between 2 and 3. These differences in the policy parameters lead
in most cases to the result that the optimized rule is not robust across the other two models. For
example, taking the rule optimized for the Smets & Wouters model with λ =1 /3 yields a relative
loss of 161.34% in the IMF model and a relative loss of 239.69% in the FRB/US model.43 Based on
43In few cases the rules optimized in another model yield a slight improvement compared to the rule optimized in the
70these results policymakers would probably be reluctant to rely on any rule that has been optimized in
a single model only.
Table 12: Robustness of model-speciﬁc rules with forecast horizon of 3 quarters
λ model used to
optimize rule
ρβγL o s s %ΔL
evaluated in CCTW-SW model
0 IMF 0.65 3.00 0.74 6.87 509.38*
0 FRB 0.95 3.00 0.51 3.95 248.70
1/3 IMF 0.77 3.00 1.81 34.25 155.77*
1/3 FRB 0.94 2.99 0.24 13.75 2.61
1 IMF 0.78 3.00 3.00 78.88 129.17*
1 FRB 0.98 2.85 3.00 69.02 100.50
evaluated in IMF model
0 CCTW-SW 0.93 3.00 0.00 1.57 40.92
0 FRB 0.95 3.00 0.51 1.66 48.26
1/3 CCTW-SW 0.78 3.00 0.04 1.39 13.77
1/3 FRB 0.94 2.99 0.24 1.94 58.87
1 CCTW-SW 0.99 3.00 0.43 3.63 111.57
1 FRB 0.98 2.85 3.00 2.95 71.73
evaluated in FRB/US model
0 CCTW-SW 0.93 3.00 0.00 6.93 56.94
0 IMF 0.65 3.00 0.74 ∞∞
1/3 CCTW-SW 0.78 3.00 0.04 ∞∞
1/3 IMF 0.77 3.00 1.81 24.80 -65.63*
1 CCTW-SW 0.99 3.00 0.43 261.28 135.91
1 IMF 0.78 3.00 3.00 77.70 -29.84*
*this rule violates the volatility restriction of the interest rate in the model that is used to evaluate the performance of the
rule.
Notes: The parameters are optimized for an inﬂation forecast horizon and an output gap horizon of three quarters ahead
(hπ =3and hy =3 , respectively). A value of ∞ shows that this speciﬁc rule does not yield determinacy.
Table 12 reports the performance and robustness of forecast-based rules. We choose a forecast
horizon of three quarters for inﬂation and the output gap as in the empirical estimation of forecast-
based policy rules for the U.S. in section 4.
Our ﬁndings indicate that model-speciﬁc rules are not robust to model uncertainty as suggested
by Taylor and Wieland (2011), Model-speciﬁc rules are ﬁne-tuned to a particular model and imply a
substantial increase in loss in other models.
Rules responding to forecasts are even less robust than the outcome-based rules in the sense that
they lead to indeterminacy in two cases. If we increase the forecast horizon to 7 quarters equilibrium
indeterminacy arises more frequently (not shown). For example, the rules optimized in the IMF model
then always induce indeterminacy in the other two models.
In sum, we ﬁnd that the advantages of forecast-based policy rules in terms of incorporating in-
formation on a wide range of state variables via the forecasts do not translate to important gains in
stabilization performance. By contrast, forecast-based rules are more prone to generate equilibrium
evaluation model, but violate the imposed upper bound of the interest rate volatility. These rules are thus not desirable.
71indeterminacy. Rules that respond to longer-horizon forecasts perform worse across models. An im-
portant extension of this analysis would be to consider the performance of model-averaging rules as
proposed by Taylor and Wieland (2011).
7 Outlook
This chapter has been concerned with studying the link between economic forecasts and policy mak-
ing, focussing in particular on the areas of monetary and ﬁscal policy. Having presented a simple
framework for linking forecasts with policy decisions, we then provided evidence that central bank
interest rate decisions are well explained by a reaction to central bank forecasts. While there is a large
literature on central bank reaction functions, it would be of great interest to shed more light on the
relationship between ﬁscal forecasts and policy decisions. There is evidence that asymmetries may
play an important role in explaining budgetary forecasts. Such asymmetric costs are likely to play
an increasingly important role in the euro area as supra-national efforts for exerting greater ﬁscal dis-
cipline on the national level take hold. An effective implementation of such ﬁscal discipline would
require careful monitoring of the quality of ﬁscal forecasts.
A large part of this chapter has then been devoted to the study of structural models that can be used
to compute forecasts that account for the interaction with policy decisions. We have also documented
that model-based forecasts just like expert forecasts have missed the onset of the great recession
in 2008/2009. In fact, models and experts generally have difﬁculty predicting recessions. On the
positive side, models and experts provided reasonably useful forecasts of the recovery process. Using
a small projection model from the IMF we found that information drawn from bank lending surveys
helped explain the recent recession as a consequence of the global ﬁnancial crisis. However, the bank
lending information appeared not sufﬁciently predictable to improve the forecasting performance of
the model. Of related interest is the evaluation of the forecasting performance of DSGE models with
ﬁnancial factors in the chapter on DSGE forecasting in this handbook by Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2012). In this chapter we used a medium-size DSGE model with a ﬁscal sector to explore the use
of alternative conditioning assumptions in predicting the GDP impact of the 2009 U.S. ﬁscal stimulus
package. Our estimates indicate a fairly small stimulative effect of such measures.
Going forward, it is of eminent importance to develop the ﬁnancial sector of DSGE models to
better capture the experience of credit boom followed by credit bust that led to the global ﬁnancial
crisis and to integrate more realistic structural representations of the fragilities in ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation. Hopefully, such modeling improvements will not only help explain past developments but also
improve forecasting accuracy.
The diversity of model and expert forecasts suggests that forecast heterogeneity and learning dy-
namics might play an important role in propagating economic ﬂuctuations. The structural forecasting
models considered in this chapter, however, all rely on the assumption of homogenous and rational
expectations. It is urgent to integrate heterogeneous expectations and learning in structural models
and evaluate the forecasting performance of such models.
72Furthermore, much work remains to be done in integrating the process in which policy makers
learn from the data and revise their models of the economy formally in policy design.
Finally, the closing section on robustness of forecast-based policies under model uncertainty
introduces a cautionary note. While forecasts play an important role in many economic policy
decision making processes caution should be exerted in basing policy explicitly on longer-run
forecasts. Model uncertainty is a major practical problem. Research on Bayesian model averaging,
robust control and worst-case analysis may help support more effective policy design that is robust to
model uncertainty.
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A A medium-scale DSGE model
This appendix provides a description of the Smets & Wouters model with rule-of-thumb consumers
estimated in Cogan et al. (2010).
The resource constraint is given by:
yt = cyct + iyit + zyzt + gt, (27)
where output yt is the sum of consumption, ct, and investment, it, weighted with their steady state
ratios to output (cy and iy), the capital-utilization cost which depends on the capital utilization rate,
zt, and government spending gt. gt follows an AR(1) process and is also affected by the technology
shock. zy equals Rk
∗ky, where ky is the ratio of capital to output in steady state and Rk
∗ is the rental
rate of capital in steady state.
Ashare1−ω ofhouseholdsindexedbyj ∈ [0,1−ω)makesoptimizing, forwardlookingdecisions
and these households have access to ﬁnancial markets. The remaining share ω of households indexed
by i ∈ [1 − ω,1] - the rule-of-thumb consumers - do not have access to ﬁnancial markets and simply
consume their wage income less lump-sum tax payments:
ci,t = Wh
∗ L∗/C∗(wt + Lt) − c−1
y tt, (28)
where parameters with a ∗ subscript denote steady state values. Combining the optimizing house-
holds’ ﬁrst order conditions for consumption and bond holdings yields the same consumption Euler
equation as in Smets and Wouters (2007). Labor unions set the same nominal wage rate for both
types of households. Hence, labor supply is equalized across the two groups. The consumption Euler
equation for optimizing households is thus given by:
cj,t = c1cj,t−1 +( 1− c1)Et(cj,t+1)+c2(lt − Et(lt+1)) − c3(rt − Et(πt+1)+ b
t. (29)
82The parameters are c1 =( λ/γ)/(1 + λ/γ), c2 =[ ( σc − 1)(Wh
∗ L∗/C∗)]/[(σc(1 + λ/γ)] and c3 =
(1 − λ/γ)/[(1 + λ/γ)σc]. λ governs the degree of habit formation, γ is the labor augmented steady
growth rate, σc the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  b
t denotes an AR(1) shock
process on the premium over the central bank controlled interest rate. Consumption of optimizing
households is a weighted average of past and expected consumption due to habit formation. The
consumption Euler equation depends on hours worked, lt, because of the non-separability of utility.
When consumption and hours are complements (σc > 1), consumption of optimizing households
increases with current hours and decreases with expected hours next period. The real interest rate
and the shock term affect aggregate demand by inducing intertemporal substitution in consumption.
Overall consumption is a weighted average of consumption of both types of households:
ct =( 1− ω)cj,t + ωcit. (30)
The investment Euler equation is given by
it = i1it−1 +( 1− i1)Et(it+1)+i2qt +  i
t, (31)
where i1 =1 /(1 + βγ1−σc) and i2 =[ 1 /(1 + βγ1−σc)γ2φ]. β denotes the discount factor, φ the
elasticity of the capital adjustment cost function, qt Tobin’s Q and  i
t an investment speciﬁc tech-
nology shock that follows an AR(1) process. Current investment is a weighted average of past and
expected future investment due to the existence of capital adjustment costs. It is positively related to
the real value of the existing capital stock. This dependence decreases with the elasticity of the capital
adjustment cost function. The arbitrage equation for the real value of the capital stock is:
qt = q1Et(qt+1)+( 1− q1)Et(rk
t+1) − (rt − Et(πt+1)+ b
t), (32)
where q1 = βγ−σc(1 − δ). rk
t denotes the real rental rate of capital and δ the depreciation rate of
capital. The real value of the existing capital stock is a positive function of its expected value next
period and the rental rate on capital and a negative function of the real interest rate and the external
ﬁnance premium.
The production process is assumed to be determined by a Cobb-Douglas production function with
ﬁxed costs:
yt = φp(αks
t +( 1− α)lt +  a
t). (33)
ks
t denotes effective capital (physical capital adjusted for the capital utilization rate),  a
t a neutral pro-
ductivity shock that follows an AR(1) process and φp is one plus the share of ﬁxed costs in production.
Output is produced using capital and labor and is boosted by technology shocks. Capital used in pro-
duction depends on the capital utilization rate and the physical capital stock of the previous period as
new capital becomes effective with a lag of one quarter:
ks
t = kt−1 + zt. (34)
83Household income from renting capital services to ﬁrms depends on rk
t and changing capital
utilization is costly so that the capital utilization rate depends positively on the rental rate of capital:
zt =( 1− ψ)/ψrk
t , (35)
where ψ ∈ [0,1] is a positive function of the elasticity of the capital utilization adjustment cost
function. The law of motion for physical capital is given by:
kt = k1kt−1 +( 1− k1)it + k2 i
t, (36)
where k1 =( 1− δ)/γ and k2 =( 1− (1 − δ)/γ)(1 + βγ1−σc)γ2φ. The price mark-up μ
p
t equals the
difference between the marginal product of labor and the real wage wt:
μ
p
t = α(ks
t − lt)+ a
t − wt. (37)
Monopolistic competition, Calvo-style price contracts, and indexation of prices that are not free
to be chosen optimally combine to yield the following Phillips curve:
πt = π1πt−1 + π2πt+1 − π3μ
p
t +  
p
t, (38)
with π1 = ιp/(1 + βγ1−σcιp), π2 = βγ1−σc/(1 + βγ1−σcιp), and π3 =1 / (1 + βγ 1−σc ιp)
[(1−βγ1−σcξp)(1−ξp)/ξp((φp−1) p+1)]. This Phillips curve contains not only a forward-looking
but also a backward-looking inﬂation term because of price indexation. Firms that cannot adjust
prices optimally either index their price to the lagged inﬂation rate or to the steady-state inﬂation rate.
Note, this indexation assumption ensures also that the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. ξp denotes
the Calvo parameter, ιp governs the degree of backward indexation,  p determines the curvature of
the Kimball (1995) aggregator. The Kimball aggregator complementarity effects enhance the price
rigidity resulting from Calvo-style contracts. The mark-up shock  
p
t follows an ARMA(1,1) process.
A monopolistic labor market yields the condition that the wage mark-up μw
t equals the real wage
minus the marginal rate of substitution mrst:
μw
t = wt − mrst = wt − (σllt +
1
1 − λ/γ
(ct − λ/γct−1)), (39)
with σl being the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The wage Phillips curve is given by:
wt = w1wt−1 +( 1− w1)(Et(wt+1)+Et(πt+1)) − w2πt + w3πt−1 − w4μw
t +  w
t , (40)
where w1 =1 /(1 + βγ1−σc), w2 =( 1+βγ1−σcιw)/((1 + βγ1−σc)), w3 = ιw/(1 + βγ1−σc), and
w4 =1 /(1+ βγ1−σc)[(1 − βγ1−σcξw)(1 − ξw)/(ξw((φw − 1) w + 1))]. The parameter deﬁnition is
analogous to the price Phillips curve.
Setting ξp =0 , ξw =0 ,  
p
t =0and  w
t =0one obtains the efﬁcient ﬂexible price and ﬂexible wage
allocation. The output gap xt is deﬁned as the log difference between output and ﬂexible price output
just like in the small-scale New-Keynesian models above.
84The government purchases consumption goods gt, issues bonds bt and raises lump-sum taxes tt.
The government budget constraint is then given by:
bt = R∗
 
bt−1π−1
∗ + gt − tt
 
, (41)
where R∗ denotes the nominal steady state interest rate and π∗ the steady state inﬂation rate. Fiscal
policy follows a rule suggested by Gal´ ı et al. (2007):
tt = φbbt + φggt, (42)
where φb and φg determine the elasticities of lump-sum taxes with respect to government debt and
government spending.
The monetary policy rule reacts to inﬂation, the output gap and the change in the output gap and
incorporates partial adjustment:
rt = ρrt−1 +( 1− ρ)(rππt + rxxt)+rΔxt(xt − xt−1)+ r
t. (43)
 r
t is a monetary policy shock that follows an AR(1) process.
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